INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION INTO THE 21ST CENTURY: FLIRTING WITH REVOLUTION by Hall, Art Alcausin
NYLS Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 
Volume 21 
Number 1 Volume 21, Number 1, 2001 Article 3 
2001 
INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION INTO THE 21ST 
CENTURY: FLIRTING WITH REVOLUTION 
Art Alcausin Hall 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/
journal_of_international_and_comparative_law 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hall, Art Alcausin (2001) "INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION INTO THE 21ST CENTURY: FLIRTING 
WITH REVOLUTION," NYLS Journal of International and Comparative Law: Vol. 21 : No. 1 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_international_and_comparative_law/vol21/iss1/
3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in NYLS Journal of International and Comparative Law by an authorized editor of 
DigitalCommons@NYLS. 
International Banking Regulation into the 21st
Century: Flirting With Revolution
Art Alcausin Hall
I. INTRODUCTION
Revolution is change - sudden, radical, or complete change. When one
shows a casual interest or flirts with revolution, however, the meaning of
revolution is weakened by a seeming umbrage of caution. An image of push-
ing something to the brink of radical change is created only to see if it is
worthy of the effort required to achieve it. Caution and revolution seem al-
most anomalous, but these terms best describe the status of international bank-
ing as it enters the 21st century; a journey involving inevitable conflicts of
culture, sovereignty, differing histories and perceptions of history, a web of
conflicting laws and policies mired by highly politicized issues, and the gen-
eral difficulty of international law and enforcement.
After placing international banking into a contextual background, this pa-
per will describe three areas in which international banking is flirting with
revolution - international cooperation, convergence, and technology.
II. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Banking in General
Banking is part of the financial services sector which includes commer-
cial and investment banking, thrift associations, securities firms, mutual fund
companies and insurance companies. Any financial services institution, at its
basic level, acts as a financial intermediator between savers, investors and bor-
rowers - between surplus economic units (households, firms, or government
units) and deficit units.1 While different systems may define involvement in
banking by the activity of the institution, the existence of a charter, or the
existence of deposit insurance for the entity,2 "the uniqueness [of banking] is
largely due to the regulatory constraints imposed on so-called banks and it is
not because of fundamental differences in the nature of their intermediation."
3
1. See TAEHO KiM, INTERNATIONAL MONEY AND BANKING 31, 36 (1993).
2. Id. at 32. "Each country legislates its own currency, with unique regulations for the
network of banking, credit, and financial transactions within its jurisdiction. These arrange-
ments, hopefully, should ensure that money, banking and finance operate smoothly. In many
ways, such arrangements are similar everywhere. But considerable differences exist among
national laws with respect to: 1) the scope for private enterprise; 2) permissible entry into bank-
ing and finance, and the latitude for chartering and branching; 3) competition among financial
institutions, their number, size and variety; 4) the role of monetary controls and interest regula-
tions; 5) public finance, revenues, taxes, and deficits; and 6) the macroeconomic policies de-
signed to coordinate fiscal, monetary, and other regulatory activities." WILLIAM A. LOVETr,
BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 1-2 (4tl1 ed. 1997).
3. KIM, supra note 1, at 32.
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Throughout the world, banking is one of the most highly regulated indus-
tries largely because of the central role that banking plays in domestic and
international financial stability and policy. The importance of a properly func-
tioning banking system-on the domestic level- has been summarized as being
"an essential part of a nation's economic well-being."
4
Because banks serve as allocators of capital as well as protec-
tors of the national payment system, their importance to a
country's economic infrastructure goes far beyond their con-
tribution to the gross national product. The presence of finan-
cially secure banks is also important for maintaining public
confidence in the economy. Bank failures undermine that
confidence and thus have negative consequences for a coun-
try's economy that often are disproportionately large com-
pared to the actual harm done to the failed bank's depositors,
borrowers and other constituents.
5
Not only does the banking industry have an impact on national econo-
mies, it also affects the international financial system, particularly if larger,
more international banks are involved. "The stability of the global market-
place depends on the strength and integrity of its participants. . .. [A] bank's
reputation for 'honorable dealing' has a force 'far greater than any law.' If
uncertainty surrounds a critical mass of banks, the entire system could become
unstable."
6
Because a banking and financial system are of fundamental importance,
depending on the goals of a particular regulation system,7 a country may focus
on one or a combination of banking objectives. "Bank regulation is in essence
a balancing tool between a variety of objectives - sometimes conflicting
ones."8 These objectives include:
4. Michael S. Bennet, Banking Deregulation in Indonesia: An Updated Perspective in
Light of the Asian Financial Crisis, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1, 9 (1999).
5. Id.
6. Brian P. Volkman, The Global Convergence of Bank Regulation and Standards for
Compliance, 115 BANKING L.J. 550, 555 (1998).
7. "[I]ndustrialized countries which depend more on private initiatives in the marketplace
may emphasize both soundness of the banking system and promotion of competition coupled
with price stability, while developing countries that are anxious for accelerated economic devel-
opment may emphasize financial resource allocation and control of capital flows." KiM, supra




(1) ...maintain[ing] a sound and efficient payment system
which is necessary for smooth commercial transactions, (2)
...control[ling] liquidity of the banking system which is a
key to price stability, (3) .. .regulat[ing] the allocation of
financial resources to achieve certain policy objectives, such
as promotion of a specific industry, (4) ... control[ling] cross-
border capital flows to insure national interest, and (5) ...
promot[ing] competition and efficiency so that banking ser-
vices are provided efficiently at competitive prices.9
B. International Banking
It is within this unique system of regulation that international banking is
defined. Banking involves four dimensions - parent organizations, facilities,
customers, and products.' 0 If any of these dimensions exists in two different
countries, the bank involved is thought to offer an international banking
service. "1
The international aspect pushes banking, and other industries, into a
whole new realm of considerations involving the constant comparison, con-
trast, and correlative juxtaposition of domestic, foreign, and international poli-
cies.12 "The difficulty in harmonization of regulations partly stems from the
fact that the host and home country governments may have different regula-
tory objectives or may not attach the same degree of importance to each objec-
tive. '' 13 While this juggling can be difficult, tense and compromising, rapid
technological and global movements require international cooperation and
accommodation.
Domestic systems have begun to change and have made efforts toward
international cooperation. International and supranational organizations are
also developing ways to deal with issues of international banking and its regu-
lation. However, these regulatory efforts have been slow, guarded and cau-
tious; as though flirting with the prospect of real revolutionary change.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 35-36.
11. Id. at 36. "Almost all countries... try to confine the enclave of international banking
activities in their countries to the sphere of foreign trade, lending and exchange activities. Most
nations prevent substantial poaching on the domestic deposit collection business of local
banks." LovE-rr, supra note 2, at 220.
12. "International banks face a significant exposure to regulatory risk because of cultural
and legal differences between their home countries and the other countries in which they oper-
ate." Volkman, supra note 6, at 582.
13. Kim, supra note 1, at 283.
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II. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
A. General Background
Spurred in part by rapid developments in communication and technology
allowing for a broader, more global market base, internationalism and subse-
quent international cooperation are pushing banking slowly from its guarded
perch to the brink of revolution. Beyond this point, it will be interesting to see
what the 21S" Century will bring in terms of the extent of this movement and
whether it becomes revolutionary.
As with many companies, banks aim to maximize their market share,
revenues, profits, and shareholder value. 14 The expansion toward a global
market has encouraged banks to market themselves to a more international
customer base while also providing them with a growing number of services.
In fact, "[t]he world's economies and financial markets clearly are becoming
increasingly interdependent."' 15 - "The commonplace notion that the world -
that society - is growing smaller and more intimate is perhaps most true in the
world. . . of finance."16 The importance and rapid growth of international
banking will only increase as we move into the 21' t century. "International
banking has become a mainstay, rather than an exceptional part of commerce,
as almost one-third of total bank assets are international in character."'
7
Additionally, cheaper information and distribution systems are the result
of technological improvements and globalism, thus increasing competition.
And, while banks once took advantage of differing regulatory systems
amongst countries to determine where to base themselves, or what currency
denominations would be,' 8 regulatory systems are slowly harmonizing na-
tional regulations to an international standard in the spirit of international
cooperation. 19
The increase in international banking activity, the movement of domestic
regulation systems toward a more internationally cooperative structure, and
the trend toward an international standard all require that international banking
regulation flirt with international cooperation. 20 The extent of this coopera-
14. See SHELAGH HEFFERNAN, MODERN BANKING IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 24 (1996).
15. Volkman, supra note 6, at 557.
16. Joel P. Trachtman, Trade in Financial Services Under GATS, NAFTA and the EC: A
Regulatory Jurisdiction Analysis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 40-41 (1995).
17. Thomas F. McInerney, II1, Note, Towards the Next Phase in International Banking Reg-
ulation, 7 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 143, 143 (1994).
18. "[Blanks attempt to take regulatory arbitrage as such opportunities are created from the
imposition of new regulations. Regulatory arbitrage in turn may negate the original purpose of
the regulation to a certain extent but at the same time reduces market segmentation created by
the regulation." IM, supra note 1, at 277.
19. See id. at 281.
20. "Over the last two decades or so, several principles of regulatory jurisdictions have
emerged as a result of major legislative actions in major industrial countries and concerted
regulatory harmonization efforts among these countries. Major legislative actions include the
US International Banking Act of 1978, the UK Banking Acts of 1979 and 1987, the French
Banking Act of 1984, and the First (1977) and Second (1989) Banking Directives of the Euro-
[Vol. 21
2001] FLIRTING WITH REVOLUTION 45
tion will depend on the willingness of domestic systems to accommodate
change and transition and to sacrifice some of their authority for the good of
the whole. At this point, the relationship has merely been a flirtatious one at
best, despite the increase in international banking activity and the resulting
need for greater international cooperation and regulation.
B. Increase in International Banking Activity And Change of
Banking Demographics
The banking industry has expanded into the international realm quite rap-
idly. "[S]ince the 1970s international banking has grown at more than 20 per-
cent per annum, which is approximately twice as fast as world trade (12
percent) and world output (10 percent)."' 2' Between 1960 and 1990, branch
assets of foreign banks located in the United States grew from $3.5 billion to
$378.8 billion.2 2 Similarly, between 1982 and 1990, the percentage of U.S.
banking assets derived from foreign banking activity grew from 15.2% to
22.9%.23 "International banking has thus developed from a relatively unim-
portant sideline activity of a few major institutions to an important financial
activity that accounts for a significant portion of the assets of a number of
large banks."
'24
Three-quarters of the total international bank loans between 1980 and
1990 have been controlled by five countries - France, Germany, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.25 The market shares controlled by
these five countries, however, reflect an interesting change in international
banking demographics. While Japan's market share grew from 4.1% to
pean Community. At the same time the formation of the Basle Committee in the late 1980s has
increased regulatory coordination. There appear to be five emerging principles of bank regula-
tory jurisdictions: (1) the host country principle [bank residence principle, but does not imply
that the host country will treat foreign banks in the same manner as domestic banks, i.e., na-
tional treatment], (2) the home country principle [nationality principle or extraterritorial princi-
ple, the basic idea is 'mutual recognition'], (3) the reciprocity principle [different regulatory
frameworks for different foreign banks], (4) the principle of regulatory policy harmonization,
and (5) the principle of separation of supervisory responsibility for solvency and liquidity [home
country provides adequate liquidity and stable monetary environment and home country pro-
vides supervision of prudential banking practices]." Id. at 281-84.
21. Mary E. Footer, GATT and the Multilateral Regulation of Banking Services, 27 INI'L
LAW. 343, 344 (1993).
22. See David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of Inter-
national Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 281, 283 (1998). For addi-
tional statistics, see KIM, supra note 1, at 291
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See KIM, supra note 1, at 39. According to one author, world economic power is based
in a triad of countries, or groups of countries in the case of Europe, called the "'Interlinked
Economy' of the United States, Europe, and Japan." Valerie J. McNevin, Policy Implications of
the NAFTA for the Financial Services Industry, 5 COLUM. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 369, 375
(1994). These three countries or group of countries not only have international impact, but they
also have strong tentacles that reach deeply and influence various important regional associa-
tions - NAFIrA, EC, and ASEAN.
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38.3%.26 In the United Kingdom and the United States, decreases were evi-
dent from 25.7% and 23.8% to 4.8% and 14.2%, respectively. 27 "In 1974, the
American banks owned 41% of the total assets of the top 10 global banks,
followed by France (25%), the U.K. (17%), West Germany (9%), and Japan
(8%). By 1988, Japan held 92.25% of the total assets of the top 10, followed
by France, with 7.75%.
''28
C. Movement Of Domestic Systems Toward Internationally
Cooperative Structures
While international banking is on the rise, it is flirting with revolution.
This is evident in the track of its movement. Banking regulation has primarily
maintained its domestic character - centered in domestic policy - even though
some banding has become international. 29 Few countries are willing to sacri-
fice sovereign authority and fear the risk of failing financial systems due to
control or influence by an international body or other non-domestic system.
For these reasons, "[b]anks operating in foreign countries must be sensitive to
the domestic laws of those countries. Banks are subject to systems of regula-
tion that vary from country to country.
'30
International banking regulation is, however, attempting to transition be-
yond domestic boundaries. Some countries have adapted their domestic bank-
ing systems to be more responsive to the new environment. Some countries
with strong regional ties are moving rapidly towards internationalizing the
banking systems within their regions. In addition, many countries are joining
supranational, multilateral efforts to internationalize certain banking regulation
standards. While some systems are more daring than others, fear that the cau-
tion of many, in effect, forces all to be somewhat cautious because they are
fearful that others will not give similar concessions.
D. Adapting National Systems: The United States
The United States, although obviously an economic power and source of
the U.S. dollar, is much less modern in its banking system than one would
think. As one of the most cautious banking systems today, it sometimes seems
to even barely flirt with revolution. Many domestic and foreign banks com-
26. See KiM, supra note 1, at 39. Note that Japan's recent economic situation and resulting
"Big Bang" reforms may change the current demographics further. The Big Bang reforms were
instituted by Prime Minister Hashimoto in 1997. See Ernest T. Patrikis, Japan's Big Bang
Financial Reforms, 24(2) BROOK. J. INT'L L. 577, 582 (1998).
27. See KiM, supra note 1, at 39.
28. HEF'FERNAN, supra note 14, at 98.
29. "While banking is an international industry, banking regulation is almost entirely na-
tional. This is true even though many banking activities have effects in multiple jurisdictions."
Stephen Zamora, Regulating the Global Banking Network - What Role (If Any) for the IMF?,
62 FoRDtAM L. Rev. 1953, 1959 (1994).
30. Lawrence L.C. Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening International Bank-
ing Supervision, 39(1) VA. J. INTr'L L. 1, 32 (1998).
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plain of the restrictions imposed by the U.S. banking system.3' One authority
cited the two most distinctive features of the U.S. banking system as "the large
number of financial institutions32 and the existence of barriers between com-
mercial and investment banking.
'33
The large number of financial institutions in the U.S. banking system
results from a decentralized, state unit banking system with numerous geo-
graphic restrictions on the location and expansion of banks. 34 The unit bank-
ing system and prohibition of nationwide banking are considered the most
important weaknesses of the U.S. banking system.
[T]he remarkable contrast between the United States banking
industry and the industries of all other major industrialized
nations suggests rather powerfully that our 'decentralized'
banking structure may not be the most efficient method for
delivering banking services in an increasingly global financial
marketplace. Even after the wave of banking consolidation
that has occurred over the past ten years, we still have over
twelve thousand [12,000] commercial banks in the United
States. This compares with approximately one hundred and
fifty [150] commercial banks in Japan, five hundred and fifty
[550] commercial banks in the United Kingdom, sixty-five
[65] commercial banks in Canada and nine hundred [900]
commercial banks in Germany . . . .The anomalous geo-
graphic restrictions on bank competition that have hampered
the growth of U.S. banks have resulted in even the largest
American banks being much smaller than their peer institu-
tions in other countries, even after the recent mega-mergers in
31. "With respect to regulatory standards among various countries, the United States is
commonly perceived as imposing the most significant regulatory burden. John Tugwell, chair-
man and CEO of NatWest Bancorp, the former United States banking subsidiary of NatWest
Plc, seemed to express such sentiments at a conference in Washington, D.C., in August 1995
when he said: '[F]oreign banks remain in the U.S. because it is an unquestionably desirable
market. But, in a rapidly changing and increasingly diversified global marketplace, overregula-
tion, however well-intentioned, can only detract from the ability to compete effectively.'
Shortly after the conference, NatWest became part of a growing trend known as 'debanking' as
it sold its commercial banking operations in the U.S. to Fleet Bank, while planning to expand its
investment banking activity in the U.S." Volkman, supra note 6, at 565-66.
32. "There are many possible explanations for the multitude of banks, such as the ongoing
constitutional struggle between the central government and the states, or the ingrained American
distrust of concentrated economic power. These historical and political factors certainly con-
tributed to the most easily identifiable cause of having many banks in the United States: prohibi-
tions on bank branching." Eric J. Gouvin, Cross-Border Bank Branching Under the NAFTA:
Public Choice and the Law of Corporate Groups, 13(2) CONN. J. OF INT'L LAW 257, 260
(1999).
33. Id. at 259.
34. See id. at 260.
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the industry. For example, only one American bank - Ci-
tibank - ranks in the top fifty banks worldwide today.
35
1. Structure and History
As with most banking systems, the U.S. system is the result of a long and
distinctive history. Banks in the United States are regulated under a dual na-
tional and state banking system, resulting in a two-tiered regulation system -
federal and state. On the federal level, there are three primary regulation agen-
cies - (1) the Comptroller of the Currency, the oldest agency having been
established in 1863, serves as the chartering, supervision, and examination au-
thority for national banks, (2) the Federal Reserve Board, founded in 1913,
serves as the chartering, supervision, and examination authority for state mem-
ber banks and, on a larger level, controls U.S. monetary policy and reserves,
and (3) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), founded in 1933,
serves as the collateral supervising agency for all national banks, most state
banks and, more generally, regulates the banking system's stability and safety.
On the state level, various state banking departments or commissions function
as regulatory agencies.
a. Great Debates
The U.S. banking system was the result of long debate between federal
and state interests in two major economic periods 36 - the Great Depression
and the period some call the "Banking Revolution.
'37
After the United States achieved its independence in 1776, three banks
were created: the United States Treasury Department in 1789, the First Bank
of the United States in 1791, and the United States Mint in 1792.38 This form-
ative period in American history involved a significant debate between feder-
alist and state interests. During this time, states began chartering banks,
forming the basis for a combined centralized and decentralized banking sys-
tem. 39 The Central Bank of the United States was eliminated 40 during the
presidency of Andrew Jackson (1829-37), "leaving decentralized, local banks
as the dominant tradition in American banking history."'4' The decentralized
state banking system resulted in a "free banking era" (1836-63),42 somewhat
35. Geoffrey P. Miller, Legal Restrictions on Bank Consolidation: An Economic Analysis,
77 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1121-22 (1992). Recent industry consolidation may change this reality.
36. "Few fields of American law are more heavily influenced by history than banking law."
JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 2 (Aspen Law
& Business 2nd ed. 1997).
37. Id. at 29.
38. See LOVET, supra note 2, at 34-35.
39. Id. at 35.
40. Actually, the Bank of the United States became a Pennsylvania state chartered bank in
1834. Id. at 38.
41. LOVETr, supra note 2, at 37.
42. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 36, at 8-10.
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of a "free-for-all," and several panics, 43 illustrating the vulnerability of the
decentralized system and "the weakness of financial institutions without disci-
plines to enforce sound banking, and without a lender of last resort to limit a
chain reaction of bank failures."'44 A rebuilding process began during the Civil
War (1861-65), resulting in the 1863 National Bank Act, which created the
Comptroller of the Currency, and a more centralized system.
45
The central system was strengthened in 1913 with the passage of the Fed-
eral Reserve Act. This Act created the Federal Reserve System, the Federal
Reserve Board, and the Federal Reserve District Banks, 46 forming the United
States' central bank. Members included all national banks and state banks that
chose to be members, and paid fees to capitalize reserve banks. Hence, today,
the U.S. system has national banks, state-chartered member banks, and state-
chartered non-member banks in a combined centralized-decentralized system.
b. Great Depression
After moving through World War I (1914-18), the American economy
suffered the Great Depression (1929-39), including the 1929 stock market
crash and a nationwide cessation of banking activities beginning on March 6,
1933. 4 7 "Over 11,000 banks had failed or had to merge, reducing the number
by 40 percent, from 25,000 to 14,000."48 The period of the Great Depression
brought on New Deal Reforms and the 1933 Banking Act. The changes in the
banking industry following the Great Depression have become hallmarks of
the American banking system. "The Great Depression, which began in the
early 1930s, presented the banking system (both commercial and investment)
with its most awesome challenge. The banking and securities regulatory struc-
ture that emerged from the Depression bore little resemblance to the relatively
unregulated system known in 1929." 4 9 The Banking Act of 1933, or The
43. Panics of 1837, 1857, 1873, 1883, and 1907.
44. LOVETT, supra note 2, at 45.
45. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 36, at 10-11.
46. Id. at 16-17.
47. See id. at 21; see also Kimberley A. McCoy, USA: Glass-Steagall on Life Support, 4
AMIcus CURIAE 29, 30 (1998).
48. Understanding How Glass-Steagall Act Impacts Investment Banking and the Role of
Commercial Banks, http://www.cftech.com/BrainBank/SPECIALREPORTS/GlassSteagall.
html, 2/6/98 [hereinafter Understanding].
49. HOWELLE E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR., REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS 43 (1999). "Much of the banking, financial, and securities legislation of the New Deal
era survives today. On the whole, it strengthened the financial system. But it should be under-
stood as a series of emergency and other corrective measures designed to be helpful, rather than
as a single master plan or ideological program. The dominant theme was pragmatism, and a
feeling that government should act forcefully to restore prosperity, if possible, and to prevent
another depression." LOVETr, supra note 2, at 53. "A fundamental goal of modern United
States banking law is to prevent another Great Depression, with massive runs on banks, and
heavy costs to society. Clearly the looseness of previous banking practices - with too many
weak and undercapitalized banks, and inadequate lender of last resort assistance to limit a
spreading panic - are considered major reasons for excessive frequency of bank failures in the
past." Id. at 131-32.
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Glass-Steagall Act, established the FDIC, creating federal guarantees for de-
posits and the division between the banking and securities industries of the
financial services sector in the United States. 50 The 1933 Act is considered
"the centerpiece of American banking policy." 51
With a strengthened Federal Reserve system, a neophyte
FDIC, and an already powerful Comptroller of the Currency,
the banking structure evolved from the Depression with a fed-
eral regulatory scheme designed to control as many banks as
possible without annihilating the state banking systems ....
These three agencies, assisted by several federal agencies that
supervise or regulate other financial institutions, constitute the
bulwark of federal banking regulation today.
52
c. "Banking Revolution"
The period after the 1933 Banking Act and the creation of the FDIC was
one of relative success and prosperity in the area of financial services. Since
the creation of the FDIC, between 1940 and 1980, "[o]nly a few hundred
American banks had failed. . . and the majority of these were salvaged in
forced merger transactions in which all depositors were fully protected (even
those uninsured). ' 53 This period of banking stability following the Depression
"came to a crashing halt," however, in the late 1970s.54 The 1980's brought
about bank failures. This change in the banking environment was largely due
to anti-inflationary efforts which led to weakened loan asset quality, increasing
bank aggressiveness so that they became willing to accept greater risks in ex-
change for higher earnings, and the relaxation of bank regulators. 55
The United States responded with further legislation. "Since 1979 bank-
ing has undergone a revolution as profound and wrenching as any prior period
50. "Popular consensus in the early 1930s was that commercial banks' securities activities
resulted in unsound stock market speculation, causing the failures of numerous banks and the
Great Depression. The Glass-Steagall Act's legislative history indicates that Congress believed
that the nexus between commercial and investment banking produced conflicts of interest and
jeopardized bank safety. In an attempt to insulate the banking system from the risks associated
with securities activities, the Glass-Steagall Act partitioned commercial and investment banking
functions by prohibiting national and state-chartered banks that were members of the Federal
Reserve System from conducting investment banking activities and from being affiliated with
investment banks. The most important provision for purposes of this article is s. 20 of the
Glass-Steagall Act." McCoy, supra note 47, at 30. Other important Glass-Steagall provisions
include §§ 16, 21, and 32. Glass-Steagall issues will be addressed in Section IV of this paper.
51. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 36, at 22.
52. JACKSON & SYMONS, supra note 49, at 44.
53. LovErr, supra note 2, at 55.
54. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 36, at 29.
55. See LOVETr, supra note 2, at 136.
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in history. Every element of the banking structure established in 1933 has
been dismantled or severely modified.
'56
The most salient areas of change ... are ... (1) deposit inter-
est rates have been deregulated; (2) geographic restraints on
bank expansion are being dismantled; (3) massive breaches
have been opened in the Glass-Steagall 'wall' between bank-
ing and securities activities; (4) differences between different
categories of financial institution.., have become less impor-
tant, and (5) bank failure has again become a serious problem,
especially in the savings and loan industry, where a wave of
failures during the 1980s imposed hundreds of billions of dol-
lars in costs on the nation's taxpayers. 5
7
Bank failures, changing legislation and recent mergers have left 8,774
commercial banks in the United States58 with larger banks playing a dominat-
ing role.5
9
The "Banking Revolution" has also been spurred by the pace of banking
and technological advancements. "Above all, . . . the revolution in banking
has occurred outside the legal system through the medium of fast-paced devel-
opments in the marketplace. ' 60 Banking still has more to accomplish in its
movement from flirtation to revolution, however, in the area of international
banking regulation.
56. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 36, at 29. "This banking revolution has been accom-
plished by agency action, judicial decision, and six important statutes: the Depository Institu-
tion Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA); the Depository Institutions
Act of 1982 (Garn-St Germain Act); the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 (CEBA);
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA); the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA); and the Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994." Id.
57. Id. at 30. The 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act removes the Glass-Steagall barriers.
58. See Nation's Banks Realize 7h Year of Record Profits, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESs-NEws,
March 16, 1999, at 3D.
59. "The 10 largest U.S. banks have more than one fourth of U.S. bank deposits, the top 25
around 43 percent, and the top 100 more than 67 percent of U.S. domestic bank deposits. (Con-
centration is appreciably higher if foreign deposits are included.)" LoVETr, supra note 2, at
184. "[S]ubstantial increases in aggregate concentration have occurred already within US finan-
cial markets. Between 1980-95 the share of domestic commercial bank deposits held by the
largest 100 U.S. BHCs grew from 46 to 67 percent. The number of commercial banks declined
from 14,600 to 10,000 ... Consolidation and concentration increased as well in the securities
industry, among mutual funds, and in the insurance industry. By the late 1980s the top 25
securities firms had 80 percent of the industry's capital (and 88 percent of their employees); the
top 25 life insurers had 65 percent of their industry's revenues, while the top 25 property-
casualty insurers had 60 percent of their industry's revenues. These other branches of the finan-
cial sector were much more nationally concentrated than commercial banking (or depository
institutions), and further consolidation occurred in the 1990s." Id. at 449-50.
60. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 36, at 29.
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2. Adapting To International Banking Today
While the United States is an international financial center, its reputation
in the international banking arena is found in its stringent domestic and inter-
national regulations. These regulations can be costly for banks interested in
locating there. The United States, however, does recognize the importance of
international banking to its domestic economy: "The importance of interna-
tional banking to the U.S. economy demonstrates that while it is necessary to
ensure the stability of the banking industry as a whole, it is also in the best
interests of the U.S. market to remain open to foreign banks. '61 International
banking in the United States can be divided into two parts - U.S. banks doing
business in foreign countries and foreign banks doing business in the United
States.
In general, the Federal Reserve Board is the primary regulator with re-
gard to U.S. banks that seek to do business abroad. "The Federal Reserve is
responsible for approving the establishment of foreign branches by member
banks and for regulating the activities of these branches. In addition, it is
responsible for regulating banks' foreign investments. Finally, the Federal Re-
serve regulates export trading companies and Edge Act corporations. '62
Banks with foreign branches must separate home and foreign branch accounts,
books, and records, including profit-loss statements.63
There are three significant time periods that emerge with regard to for-
eign banks doing business in the United States - pre-1978, 1978-1991, and
post-1991.64 During the period preceding 1978, foreign banks operating in the
United States were governed by a special set of rules that were separate from
the rules governing domestic banks. This special set of rules, in many re-
spects, made banking easier for foreign banks than for domestic banks "with
respect to their ability to expand geographically and to the stringency of regu-
lation imposed on them here."'65
This changed in 1978 when the International Banking Act (IBA) of 1978
was passed. The banking atmosphere in the United States, prior to the passage
of the IBA, is described as follows:
In 1970, seven of the top ten banks in the world were U.S.
banks. By 1977, seven of the top ten banks in the world were
foreign banks. After U.S. multinational companies expanded
into the international arena, the banks followed their corporate
customers. 'Meanwhile, a silent invasion of the United States
was taking place. Just as United States banks found lucrative
61. Kristin L. Case, The Dawai Wake-up Call: The Need for International Standards for
Banking Supervision, 26 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 215, 225-26 (1996).
62. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 36, at 698-99.
63. See id. at 699.
64. Id. at 684-87.
65. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 36, at 684.
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markets abroad, so foreign banks began finding a lucrative
market in the United States.' Unlike domestic banks, no laws
prevented foreign banks from interstate branching until the
enactment of the International Banking Act of 1978. The IBA
prevented foreign banks from exploiting a competitive advan-
tage over domestic banks.
66
The 1978 Act brought foreign banks under increased federal scrutiny in
an effort to obtain "competitive equality" through domestic regulation and na-
tional treatment.
67
[The Act] established mandatory federal jurisdiction over the
domestic operations of foreign banks, and it vested regulatory
responsibility in the Federal Reserve Board. The Board re-
quires foreign banks to hold reserves, and it examines
branches and agencies of foreign banks.68 Under the dual sys-
tem of regulation between federal and state governments, both
the Federal Reserve and state banking authorities must ap-
prove the establishment of foreign bank offices incorporated
under state law. 69
In 1991, following the Bank of Credit and Commerce International
(BCCI) scandal, some special control mechanisms were added to the regula-
tion of foreign banks operating in the United States with the passage of the
Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991 (1991 Act).70 The BCCI
scandal is described as follows:
Through widespread fraud, deception and money laundering,
BCCI was able to conceal its insolvency for a number of
years, eventually resulting in the failure of a $20 billion bank.
BCCI cloaked its fraud under the auspices of a large number
of branch banks throughout the world, including the United
States, Western Europe, and the Middle East. In all, BCCI
operated in seventy-six countries. By exploiting the gaps in
the regulatory regimes of its hosts, BCCI was able to escape
regulation and elude authorities for decades. Eventually, the
fraud was exposed. . .. The lack of comprehensive regulation
over much of BCCI's operations prevented earlier diagnosis
66. Karen MacAllister, Comment, NAFTA: How the Banks in the United States and Mexico
will Respond, 17 Hous. J. INT'L L. 273, 277-78 (1994).
67. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 36, at 685.
68. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 36, at 685, citing 12 U.S.C. § 3105.
69. Mclnerney, supra note 17, at 146.
70. Enacted as Title II of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, Pub.
Law No. 102-242 § 201105 STAT. 2286 (1991) 12 U.S.C. 3101.
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and led to its insolvency with sustained losses estimated at
$10 billion.7
1
The United States reacted to the BCCI scandal with the 1991 Foreign
Bank Supervision Act which granted authority to the Federal Reserve "to ex-
amine foreign banks in the United States as if they were domestic bank hold-
ing companies. '72 It also required that the Federal Reserve "carefully review
foreign applications for entry into the U.S. banking market. '73 The 1991 Act
was "criticized as being overly burdensome" and driving some banks from the
U.S. market.74 Its effect, however, ensured "that no foreign bank will escape
supervision in its future dealings in the United States."'75 The 1991 Act also
required federal access to information regarding all operations and activities of
foreign banks.
"The Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act marked a departure
from the practice of having individual state authorities serve as the primary
regulators of foreign banks to a system in which the Federal Reserve serves as
the primary regulator, regardless of whether the foreign establishment receives
a state or federal charter." 76 The BCCI scandal provides many lessons to both
the United States and the movements toward international cooperation. "The
main lesson of the BCCI affair is that a bank structured in a way that makes
effective supervision impossible should not be allowed to expand to become a
$20 billion institution. . .. [N]either the home country (Luxembourg) nor the
principal host country (the United Kingdom) should have permitted BCCI to
expand its operations in such a manner."'77
The ramifications of the BCCI case will continue to affect both the na-
tional and international arenas, probably for years to come. In fact,
[t]he BCCI case proves that banking regulators in different
countries in which a bank is operating should not assume that
some other regulator was responsible for the overall health
and solvency of a bank. In BCCI's case, Luxembourg, the
location of BCCI's bank holding company, did not exercise
significant regulatory authority because BCCI's operations
were largely offshore. 78
The implementation of the 1991 Act by the United States ensures that the
U.S. federal government will play a larger role in the evaluation, monitoring,
and regulation of foreign banks doing business here.
71. Mclnerney, supra note 17, at 144-45.




76. Case, supra note 61, at 226.
77. Richard Dale, Bank Regulation After BCCI, I J. OF INT'L BANKING L. 8, 14 (1993).
78. Zamora, supra note 29, at 1960.
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The Banking Holding System is of significant relevance to the United
States' international banking scene. 79 A bank holding company is a company
that controls a bank. "The statute, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a), articulates three con-
ditions constituting control over a bank: 1) owning, controlling, or having the
power to vote 25 percent of any class of voting securities of a bank or a bank
holding company; 2) controlling the election of a majority of the board of
directors; 3) exercising a direct or indirect controlling influence over the insti-
tution's management or policies." 80 Bank holding companies have two goals
in mind - "promoting the development of a dispersed and locally-controlled
banking system while at the same time insulating the business of banking from
other commercial activities."
'8'
Companies have preferred to use the bank holding company structure pri-
marily to overcome domestic restrictions on location and interstate branching
and restrictions on the types of activities permitted by banks. 82 Armed with
controlling stock in one or more banks, bank holding companies became the
primary integration tool of financial services companies. Today, the holding
company structure is of less significance because branching and interstate
banking regulations have changed. "Today .... [o]n the state level, virtually
all states now permit state-wide branching. On the interstate level, . . . [t]he
Riegle-Neal law permits nationwide interstate branching, thereby negating the
requirement that holding companies operating in several states have a bank
chartered in each of those states."
83
E. Developing Regional Efforts
1. European Community
While the United States is highly cautious as it flirts with revolution, the
European Community ("EC") has come much closer to the brink of revolution.
With its modem international banking system, the EC has some of the largest
international, universal banking systems. Furthermore, its very nature as a
community of nations organized into an economic union, forces the financial
services industry and regulations to be centralized in some manner. Thus, they
are international in nature and character.
The EC uses as its model the largest economy in Europe and often con-
sidered the financial center of the European Union - Germany, which has a
universal system of banking that is "arguably the most liberal in the world.
84
79. United States federal banking holding company regulations are found in the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1848 (1997).
80. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 36, at 353.
81. Gouvin, supra note 32.
82. See id.
83. Gouvin, supra note 32, at 260-61.
84. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 36, at 723, citing Staff of House Committee on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 10 1S Cong., 2d Sess., An International Comparison of Banking
Regulatory Structures, Comm. Print 101-03 (June 1990) [hereinafter International Comparison
of Banking Regulatory Structures].
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The definition of banking activity is wide open in Germany and the EC.
While banking, securities, and insurance activities are permitted by any entity,
the only restriction is these activities take place in different bank
departments.
85
The Second Banking Directive of 1993 "permits EC banks to employ a
single banking license to automatically branch or cross-border market their
services to any of the other EC countries." In addition, the directive provides
for uniform prudential standards and the international policy of "national
treatment."' 86 Hence, a bank, or its subsidiary licensed in one Member coun-
try, may establish branches in any other Member country. "The Second Bank-
ing Directive builds on the First Banking Directive of 1977 and the
Consolidated Supervision Directive of 1983, but goes further in its objective,
which is to lift entry barriers within the Community.
'87
The Second Banking Directive does not apply, however, to banks based
in non-EC countries. "Instead, the Directive leaves the granting of licenses for
subsidiaries or branches of banks registered outside the EC to the discretion of
each Member State."
88
2. North American Free Trade Agreement
While not nearly as extensive or developed as the EC, the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") is another regional group involved
with issues of international banking. NAFTA is the first regional trade agree-
ment to include financial services in its realm of governance.89 The success of
NAFTA in dealing with banking and financial services will be closely ob-
served, particularly because "[t]he three NAFTA countries have three very
different banking markets. These markets have been shaped by each country's
unique history and politics. The regulatory schemes of the three countries
have also molded the banking markets within their respective borders." 90 If
85. See id.
86. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 36, at 724, citing International Comparison of Banking
Regulatory Structures. The goals of the EC center "upon the establishment of a common mar-
ket and an economic and monetary union. Enhanced prosperity is achieved by reducing tariff
and non-tariff barriers to trade. Reduction of barriers to trade provides opportunities for greater
- Community-wide - economies of scale. More importantly, it enhances competition, provid-
ing discipline to enterprise and thus reducing costs." Trachtman, supra note 15, at 60. While
the freedom of movement of services is a right of establishment authorized in Article 52 of the
Treaty of Rome, the heart of the non-discrimination rule dealing with services is found in Arti-
cle 59. See id. "However, non-discriminatory regulation may be protected under certain cir-
cumstances, even though the regulation differs from that imposed by other member states, and
even though it imposes differential burdens on persons from other member states." Id. at 61.
Article 3(c) of the Treaty of Rome similarly requires the abolition of obstacles to trade in ser-
vices as well as the free movement of capital.
87. Footer, supra note 21, at 361.
88. Id.
89. See McNevin, supra note 25, at 380.
90. Gouvin, supra note 32, at 259.
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NAFTA works well, it may become a model for other regional and interna-
tional efforts.
Chapter 12 of NAFTA applies to services and deals with national treat-
ment and most favored nation (MFN) rules. Chapter 12 excludes financial
services, however, a topic that is covered in Chapter 14 of NAFTA and vari-
ous annexes. In a nutshell, "NAFTA gives banks from each of the member
nations access to the banking markets of the other member nations." 9' Canada
and Mexico merely permit access to their markets via the establishment of a
new subsidiary. The United States permits access by establishing a new bank
or acquiring an existing institution, in addition to the ability to branch into the
United States subject to the same regulations placed on other foreign institu-
tions that branch into the United States.
92
a. Access To U.S. Banking Market
The effect of NAFTA on the banking industries of each country varies.
For example, very little changed with regard to Canada and Mexico's access to
the U.S. market. "The United States already extended national treatment to all
foreign banking organizations doing business in the United States. Before the
treaty both Canadian and Mexican banks had access to the U.S. market on
terms similar to those available to all other countries.
93
b. Access to Canadian Banking Market
When looking at access to Canada by banks in the United States and
Mexico, it is important to look first at Canada's banking structure. Canada's
banking system requires the Federal Charter of all banks.94 Banks are divided
into two categories: Schedule I banks, which are "subject to the 'widely-held'
rule [in which] no person or group may control more than ten percent of the
voting stock."'95 There are also Schedule II banks, which "may be closely held
and owned by non-Canadians." 96 Canada's system of banking promotes a
sense of community ownership because Canada is dominated by six large
Schedule I institutions with nationwide branching networks rather than the
"thousands of independent banks found in the United States."
'97
NAFTA changed little between the United States and Canada due to their
previous Free Trade Agreement ("FTA"). "Under the FT7A, U.S. banks gained
preferential access to the Canadian banking market.... As a result of the FTA
changes, U.S. banks were no longer subject to the foreign ownership restric-
91. Id. at 258-59.
92. See id.
93. Gouvin, supra note 32, at 270.
94. See id. at 265.
95. Gouvin, supra note 32, at 265, citing Bank Act, R.S.C., ch. B-1.01, §370(2)(1996)
(Canada).
96. Id. at 266.
97. Id. at 265-66.
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tions of the Bank Act." 98 Canada has since expanded that same preferential
treatment to Mexico. "The Bank Act now makes special provision for
'NAFTA country residents.' 99
In addition, while Canada has liberalized the national treatment of United
States and Mexican Schedule II banks by permitting them to branch across
Canada in the same way Canadian Schedule I banks may, " [T]hey may not
branch directly into Canada, but may operate in Canada only through a Cana-
dian-chartered Schedule II subsidiary."'00
In any event, NAFTA will have very little effect on the Canadian market
for two reasons. First, the Schedule I/Schedule II distinction will continue to
limit foreign banks to Schedule II status "as long as the 'widely held' rule
remains in place."' 01 Second, Canada's market is already over-banked and
controlled by the dominant Canadian banks. In fact, Canadian banks have be-
gun to look for growth opportunities outside of Canada. 0 2 The NAFTA's
relatively benign provisions allow slightly easier access to a mature market for
American and Mexican banks "where well-established firms have long cus-
tomer relationships and efficient operations."' 0 3 Foreign financial service
providers, however, "have found it very difficult to establish profitable opera-
tions in Canada."' 4 Furthermore, even though "many U.S. banks maintain a
presence in Canada, it is clear they will never be major players there."'
0 5
c. Access To Mexican Banking Market
Probably the greatest benefit in the banking services arena from NAFTA
came to both the United States and Canada by giving them access to the young
and undeveloped Mexican market. The United States, in particular, has a
"long and progressive history of regulations developed to ensure banking in-
tegrity and the stability of the depositor's interest,"10 6 In comparison, Mex-
ico's banking history "is completely overshadowed by and subject to the
history of politics and government."'
' 0 7
Mexico's banking industry has been dominated by the politically elite
and wealthy of the country. The Spanish crown and Catholic Church domi-
nated both the government and the economy well into the twentieth century by
owning all lands and resources in the colonies.' 0 8 "[L]and was in the hands of
98. Id. at 270-7 1.
99. Id.
100. Id at 271.
101. Id. at 287.
102. See id.
103. Gouvin, supra note 32, at 287-88.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. MacAllister, supra note 66, at 279.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 279-80.
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a very few families that descended from the original Spanish land grant own-
ers and the Catholic Church ... a major beneficiary of early land grants." 10 9
Following the revolution in 1910, land was broken up into small plots of
land called "ejidos." 10  This breakup contributed very little, however, to
forming capital and family wealth in Mexico, as it had done in the United
States.111  "'As a result of agriculture's failure to serve as a source of capital,
Mexico's attempts at economic development have been characterized by boom
and bust.' With a deficient source of internal capital, Mexico has always
turned to external sources for capital."" 2 This was complicated by a relatively
closed economy and political system, in which "control and benefit of the
development remained in the government."
1 13
The 1920s was a turbulent period in Mexico, leading to the foundation of
many components of modern Mexico, such as the Partido Revolucionario In-
stitutional (PRI), Mexico's ruling party today.114 While Mexico experienced
economic prosperity throughout the 1940s and 1960s, in 1982:
Mexico announced a suspension of payments on its massive
external debt that sent hundreds of foreign banks reeling. 'Re-
liance on external financing of economic development re-
sulted in economic disaster when oil prices and interest rates
on debt began to slide in opposite directions.' Later in the
year, President Lopez Portillo announced the nationalization
of the banks, leaving Citibank the only private bank in
Mexico."15
Banks were later privatized in Mexico in 1990, under the administration
of President Carlos Salinas. By then, however, "[o]nly eighteen banks re-
main[ed]. . . .down from 109 depository institutions in 1974."116 Today,
banks in Mexico are free to branch anywhere in the country and affiliate with




11. See id. at 281. "Little basis for a banking system exists if citizens are not accumulating
capital. The banking system in the United States is the direct descendant of the great banking
houses that first developed in London as merchant bankers and later in the United States. Pri-
vate family wealth, originally accumulated through the sale of land holdings and later trans-
ferred into commercial enterprises, helped found these great banking houses. With no
widespread private accumulation of capital in Mexico, banks were a risky business that exerted
virtually no influence on the economy except as instruments of the government."; MacAllister,
supra note 66, at 281.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 284.
114. See id. at 283.
115. MacAllister, supra note 66, at 284.
116. Id. at 287.
117. See id.
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Supervision in Mexico is handled by three government agen-
cies: the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank, and the Na-
tional Banking Commission, which has adopted a program
closely modeled on the U.S. FRB. The National Banking
Commission employs six or seven full time auditors to super-
vise each bank. The banks are also regulated by the Basle
Agreement . . .. Citibank remains subject to both Mexican
supervision and FRB supervision as a foreign branch of a U.S.
bank. 1 18
Prior to NAFTA, Mexico's market was closed to foreign banks.
"NAFTA changed that by permitting U.S. and Canadian banks to establish
wholly-owned banking subsidiaries in Mexico. Given the relative weakness of
Mexico's banking system compared to its two imposing northern neighbors,
however, Mexico negotiated for some protections in the NAFTA to prevent
foreign domination of the Mexican banking industry."' 19 Nonetheless, Mex-
ico provided the United States and Canada with significant opportunities.
"While the markets in the United States and Canada are fairly well saturated
with banking services, Mexico is dramatically under banked."120 Although
political risk in Mexico is still a concern for U.S. and Canadian banks, the
subsidiary format might work well to limit extended liability of those banks.
While concerns over the comparative stages of development of the bank-
ing systems, the comparative stability of the currencies, and the differences in
the systems of banking in the United States, Canada and in Mexico persist,
efforts toward continued standardization and cooperation will push, (though
slowly and cautiously), these and many other countries toward improvement,
liberalization, and openness.
F. Global Efforts in International Banking
1. History
The spirit of international cooperation has surpassed domestic and re-
gional efforts, moving toward the global level. Even so, this movement has
not yet progressed to the revolutionary stage. The movement seems to remain
at the more comfortable flirtatious stage. On the global level, markets opened
with the introduction of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"). 12 1 The GATT aimed to lower tariffs and to remove other trade
118. MacAllister, supra note 66, at 288.
119. Gouvin, supra note 32, at 271.
120. Id. at 288.
121. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-l1, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GAT].
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restrictions related to the trade in goods. The result of the GATT has been a
more productive, cooperative, and efficient global economy.
122
While the GATT has dealt with trade in goods, the global community has
begun to focus on opening trade in the area of services, though at a more
cautious rate than the opening of trade in goods, through the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services (GATS). 123 The promotion of free trade in services
became a topic during the 1973-79 GATT Tokyo Round.
Services were not formally considered a trade issue in the
GATT sense until at least 1986, when the United States suc-
ceeded in negotiating the inclusion of services in the Punta del
Este Ministerial Declaration. Even in that declaration, it was
"agreed that these negotiations will not be placed within the
legal framework of GATT, but that GATT practices and pro-
cedures will nevertheless apply to them."
124
Greater work in the area of trade in services began in 1986 with the Uru-
guay Round.' 25 The result was a resulting in a signed GATS agreement in
April 1994, to take effect January 1, 1995.126 To some, the most important
achievement that came out of the negotiations "was to bring service sector
liberalization into the domain of the world trading system."'
2 7
2. Application to Financial Services
The GATS is important to the present discussion because of its potential
application to certain parts of the financial services industry. Developing a
central consensus and regulatory standard in the financial services industry is
difficult because of the complexity of the industry and nature of services, par-
ticularly compared to goods, and the myriad of differences between the coun-
tries. For example:
122. "Measured by the volume of imports and exports, the world economy has become in-
creasingly integrated .... A fall in barriers to trade has helped stimulate this growth .... The
ratio of world exports to GDP has climbed from 7% to 15%." Trade Winds, THE ECONOMIST,
Nov. 8, 1997, at 124.
123. See General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, April 15, 1994, Annex
IB, General Agreement on Trade in Services, 33. I.L.M. 1125, 1167 [hereinafter GATS].
124. Trachtman, supra note 16, at 44.
125. See Matthew Kennedy, Services Join GATT: An Analysis of the General Agreement on
Trade in Services, 1(1) INT'L TRADE LAW AND REG. 11, 11 (1995).
126. The Uruguay Round also officially created the World Trade Organization (WTO).
"[T]he General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) became the first legally enforceable
agreement covering trade in services." Case, supra note 61, at 219.
127. Laura Altinger & Alice Enders, The Scope and Death of GATS Commitments, 19(3)
WORLD ECON. 307, 326 (1996). "Drafting trade agreements that cover services is always diffi-
cult because of the issues such as defining what constitutes a service, figuring out where it is
performed, and finding equitable treatment for labor-intensive as opposed to capital-intensive
services." Gouvin, supra note 32, at 258.
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The extremely complex nature of the financial industry is typ-
ified by the diversity of services and products offered and by
the multiplicity of sub-markets. Different banking systems,
and variations in the way banking products and services are
provided, regulated, and supervised emerges as an important
factor when negotiating on trade in financial services gener-
ally and on banking services specifically.
128
The WTO aims to overcome these differences and to develop a consensus.
"The aim is to steer between the Scylla of a minimal trade position where
market access is virtually non-existent and the Charybdis of totally unregu-
lated trade and access with the consequence that many national systems would
be overwhelmed by large international firms.
129
The GATS "was made specifically applicable to the financial services
sector by the inclusion of the Annex on Financial Services which adapted the
general provisions of GATS to the financial sector."' 30 The GATS was struc-
tured to allow countries to preserve all free trade in services that presently
exist,' 31 giving the international business sector the benefit of certainty regard-
ing trade provisions in other countries.
3. Horizontal Rules
The GATS is composed of horizontal, or general, rules which apply to all
Members.132 Members can "opt-out" of these general obligations through ex-
emptions. Only those industries specified on a "negative list" can chose these
exemptions. The central, horizontal obligation of GATS is the MFN principle
found in Article II. This requires one Member to treat all other Members
uniformly. Members can list derogations from the MFN in the separate Annex
on Article II Exemptions.' 33 This derogation list was instituted because many
countries, particularly developed countries, felt that the possibility of free-rid-
ers was greater under the GATS since Members could technically keep all of
their service markets completely closed.1 34 As a limitation, the MFN exemp-
128. Footer, supra note 21, at 353.
129. Jeffrey Simser, GATS and Financial Services: Redefining Borders, 3 BUFF. J. INT'L L.
33, 47 (1996).
130. Case, supra note 61, at 220; see Simser, supra note 129, at 57.
131. "GATS is intended, at this stage, to supplement existing arrangements, rather than su-
persede them ... The new agreement preserves, rather than revolutionizes, existing agreements
and arrangements." Kennedy, supra note 125, at 15.
132. Set out in Part II of the GATS, supra note 123, at 1169-70.
133. Id., supra note 123, art. 11(2), at 1170.
134. "The United States felt this particularly strongly because in some services sectors -
notably financial services and telecommunications - it believed that it was already offering
much freer access to foreign suppliers than most countries." J. CROOME, RESHAPING THE
WORLD TRADING SYsTEM: A HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 313 (1995). "Just as develop-
ing countries had resisted a broad definition of 'services,' developed countries resisted ex-
tending MFN to all members ... [The] 'free rider' problem complicated the GATS negotiations
particularly in respect of the financial services sector." Simser, supra note 129, at 49.
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tions could only be made at the time the agreement was entered, thus limiting
the addition of other exemptions. 135 "'In principle, "exemptions are not to run
longer than ten years and in any event are to be negotiated in subsequent liber-
alizing rounds. The Council for Trade in Services shall review all exemptions
with a duration of five years or more." 136 The comparative result of the GATS
is that most commitments under the GATS are optional and reciprocity is not
as important under the GATS as they are under the GATT 137 - a sign of
cautious flirtation with change as opposed to a movement of outright
revolution.
Another exemption is found in Article V, in which Members are permit-
ted to create regional agreements that liberalize trade among themselves with-
out having the concessions apply to other Members.1 38 Article V of the GATS
also encourages countries to gradually open other trade in services while pre-
serving those that exist. 1
39
4. Vertical Rules
GATS is also composed of vertical, or specific, rules which are "individ-
ual commitments by each member to grant market access and national treat-
ment to services and service providers of other members. 1 40 This "opt-in"
approach allows Members to create a "positive list" of areas in which they
would like market access and national treatment to apply. 14 1 Unless an indus-
try is listed, it is automatically excluded from the agreement. 1
42
5. Limited Impact of GATS
While including services in the governance of the WTO is indeed a laud-
able step, many nations have complained of its limited impact. This slow
movement is, in part, a result of an interest in caution of the opening of inter-
national banking doors. For example:
135. Id. at 50.
136. Id.
137. See Part III of GATS, supra note 123 at 1179-80.
138. See Part II of GATS, supra note 123, at 1171-72.
139. Id.
140. Kennedy, supra note 125, at 13. Vertical rules are set out in Part III of GATS, supra
note 23, at 1179-80.
141. See GATS, Part HI, supra note 23, at 1179-80. The principle specific commitments of
market access and national treatment are set out in Articles XVI and XVII, respectively. "Mar-
ket access is the policy instrument by which governments exercise their discretionary powers as
to which foreign banks shall be granted access to their domestic markets. The principle of
national treatment comes into play once access has been granted and concerns the continuing
treatment that the supplier of the banking services can expect to receive from the authorities of
the importing country." Footer, supra note 21, at 360.
142. "Schedules of specific commitments shall be annexed to this Agreement and shall form
an integral part thereof." GATS, Part III, Art. XX (3), supra note 23, at 1181.
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The exemptions for MFN and the exemptions on specific
commitments . . . have been described as 'structural weak-
nesses.' Many of the obligations are triggered by a 'shopping
list' approach and GATS can only be understood by reading
the schedules both of commitments and exemptions .... The
GATS was created after a lengthy period of political negotiat-
ing and bargaining. The compromises necessary to create the
agreement were driven by political considerations, not purely
by technical trade issues. If the goal of GATS was to create
an all-encompassing principle-based agreement, then GATS
might be adjudged a failure. However, if GATS is viewed as
a first step towards liberalization along the lines of the 1947
GATT, then the jury is still out. As one commentator has sug-
gested, the key policy feature of GATS is 'progressive liberal-
ization rather than single reform.' An idea enshrined in the
preamble to GATS [sic]. 14 3
The banking industry and federal government in the United States, and in
several other countries, have been at the forefront of efforts which are aimed at
liberalizing global trade in services. This move will, hopefully, result in a
"needed marketplace expansion for the highly-developed service providers in
the United States." 144 These efforts faced an important setback in 1995.
Despite the openness of the U.S. financial market, on June 29,
1995, the United States withdrew its offer of full market liber-
alization and decided to limit future access to institutions from
countries which provide reciprocal rights . . .. [T]he with-
drawal was occasioned by the failure of other countries to of-
fer full market access on a most-favored nation basis so that
there 'were important, significant deficiencies across the sec-
tor.' The insufficiency of other countries' offers was deter-
mined to pose a risk to U.S. financial institutions which could
be forced to withdraw from the foreign market without a U.S.
right to seek redress under the World Trade Organization sys-
tem. Additionally, the United States decided global market
liberalization could be more readily achieved in bilateral ne-
gotiations because full access to the U.S. market would de-
prive the United States of negotiating leverage and cement
other countries' restrictions on entry.
1 45
143. Simser, supra note 129, at 50-51.
144. MacAllister, supra note 66, at 274.
145. Case supra note 61, at 227-28. "Americans were dissatisfied with the positions tabled
by a number of developed countries (notably Japan) and a number of developing countries,
particularly in Asia and South America (notably India, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brazil). Ameri-
can negotiators feared extending MFN status and creating a free rider problem with a number of
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Instead of utilizing the WTO as its channel, the United States began to
use bilateral agreements to open markets, particularly with Japan, with whom
the United States was most dissatisfied under the GATS. "In January [1996],
an agreement was reached with Japan that opened up Japanese markets ...
The market for foreign investment advisory firms was expanded from 25% to
61% of the Japanese financial market."'
146
While the United States began to open markets through its own efforts, its
withdrawal from the financial services agreement was still a major setback for
the globalization of the financial services sector, and potentially "for the de-
velopment of international standards for banking supervision."' 47 As one au-
thority stated:
In order to foster and encourage the GATS liberalization pro-
cess, there should be a definitive set of legally binding rules
and standards that countries can point to in order to ascertain
exactly what they can expect from others and what is expected
of them. If international standards are not developed, there is
a risk not only that the U.S. policy of welcoming foreign
banks into the U.S. market will become increasingly criticized
by the American public, but also that, because of the indispu-
table need for the liquidity that foreign banks provide, indus-
trialized nations will form increasingly stringent standards
which only other 'club' members will be able to meet.
148
G. Supranational Regulation and Standards
1. Barings/Daiwa
Two recent events in international banking spurred cooperation on the
supranational level even further, though still merely flirting with revolution.
On February 23, 1995, the Singapore subsidiary of Barings Bank informed its
England-based parent that it "had accumulated and hidden trading losses in
excess of $1.3 billion, nearly three times the value of the bank's capital."'
149
The responsible Singapore trader was able to accumulate these losses by "pur-
portedly manipulating and controlling the front office trading and back office
settlement activities and by using fictitious client accounts."15 0 On Sunday,
states which had threatened to completely close their markets to U.S. access . Simser,
supra note 129, at 54-55.
146. Id.
147. Case, supra note 61, at 228.
148. Id. at 229.
149. Volkman, supra note 6, at 551. The failure of Barings was "due principally to rapidly
accumulated trading losses in cross-market exchange-traded derivatives positions." Joseph J.
Norton & Christopher D. Olive, The Ongoing Process of International Bank Regulatory and
Supervisory Convergence: A New Regulatory-Market "Partnership," 16 ANN. REv. BANKING
L. 227, 235 (1997).
150. Id. at 240.
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February 26, after the Bank of England ended rescue efforts, Barings, "one of
the oldest and most reputable financial institutions in England,"' 5' failed. The
collapse of Barings is said to be the result of "corporate mismanagement, lack
of internal controls, and lack of coordination and cooperation between interna-
tional banking supervisors and securities regulators."'
152
In a similar incident, on Monday, July 24, 1995, the New York subsidiary
of Daiwa Bank informed its Japan-based parent that it "had covered up $1.1
billion in trading losses over a period of eleven years."' 153 Japan's central
bank, the Ministry of Finance ("MoF"), was not informed until August 8,
"concerned about further disrupting an already unstable Japanese banking
market."' 154 The primary U.S. federal regulator, the New York Federal Re-
serve, learned of Daiwa's losses only on September 18. In addition, the U.S.
regulators were initially lead to believe that the MoF had been notified of the
issue the same day. On November 2, 1995 in response to the trading scandal,
the United States terminated its operations of the bank. The Daiwa incident
revealed mismanagement problems that were similar to the Barings case in
exhibiting a "failure to establish and to maintain appropriate internal controls
over the New York branch's front office for securities trading, and its back
office for settlement and custodial activities. The same person, a senior execu-
tive at the branch, allegedly controlled both activities."' 55 The added differ-
ence in the Daiwa incident is that the MoF openly deceived U.S. banking
officials.
These two incidents "exposed weaknesses in every step of the regulatory
ladder: from the failure of each banks' management, to failures of both the
home country and host country supervisors, to a general failure of the global
regulatory framework."' 156 Daiwa and Barings encouraged the United States
and other countries toward "ongoing, effective international cooperation
among the world's banking regulators in the supervision of international bank
activities under the Basle Committee initiatives."'
57
2. Individual Country Responses
Many countries responded to both the Barings and Daiwa incidents. Af-
ter Daiwa, the United States revised its Foreign Bank Enforcement Act in
1996 "to clarify the authority of the Federal Reserve to terminate the opera-
tions of foreign banks in the U.S., as well as its authority to prohibit convicted
individuals from serving at U.S. facilities of foreign banks."' 158 In 1997, the
General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that, "since the Daiwa affair, the
151. Volkman, supra note 6, at 551.
152. Norton & Olive, supra note 149, at 239.
153. Volkman, supra note 6, at 550.
154. Id.
155. Norton & Olive, supra note 149, at 242.
156. Volkman, supra note 6, at 554.
157. Norton & Olive, supra note 149, at 243.
158. Volkman, supra note 6, at 578.
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Federal Reserve has endeavored to identify and correct internal control weak-
nesses at foreign bank branches, and that enhanced cooperation with the regu-
latory authorities of other nations, including Federal Reserve training
programs regarding internal controls, have strengthened the regulatory
process."1 59
Japan began to not only attack the shortcomings of an authority's use of
regulations but more importantly to attack the weaknesses in the regulatory
structure. "ITihe MoF issued a Directive designed to strengthen banking su-
pervision in Japan. The Directive indicates a shift from regulation based on
trust to U.S.-style management-based- regulation. At the same time, the Di-
rective reflects the MoF's decision to more effectively use its regulatory
structure."
1 60
The United Kingdom responded by transferring all financial regulation to
a single regulator.1 6' England hoped "to more effectively coordinate financial
policy, supervision, enforcement, and information sharing." 162 Furthermore,
in May 1995, the U.S. Commodity Future Trading Commission (CFTC) and
the U.K. Securities and Investment Board (SIB) gathered futures regulators
from many countries and issued the Windsor Declaration in which:
[Flutures regulators agreed to support mechanisms to improve
among themselves the timely communication of information
relevant to material exposures and other regulatory concerns
.... 163 [T]he Windsor Declaration has prompted regulators in
various jurisdictions to undertake related domestic regulatory
reforms related to international supervisory and regulatory co-
operation, coordination, and information-sharing arrange-
ments. 164
These crises and the responses from the various countries all reveal that:
[L]ocal regulators are prepared to coordinate their supervisory
efforts on a global basis. As they proceed with this coordina-
tion, it is important for local regulators to carefully separate
weaknesses in their regulatory schemes from weaknesses in
their own application of regulations. Without such a distinc-
tion, coordinated global supervision of banks could become
159. Id.
160. Id. at 580.
161. "The transition will take several years to complete, but as a first step, the supervisory
functions of the Bank of England will be blended into the Securities and Investment Board
(SIB) early in 1998. Eventually, England's futures regulator, the Securities and Futures Author-
ity; its insurance regulator, the Insurance Department of Trade and Industry; and a number of
other financial regulators will be combined under a single regulatory umbrella." Id. at 579.
162. Id.
163. Norton & Olive, supra note 149, at 246.
164. Id. at 248.
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laden with duplicative regulations that are not effectively
implemented. 165
3. Basle Committee
In 1995, Barings and Daiwa stimulated work that the Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision, (known as the Basle Committee) had begun, 166 pushing
international banking closer to the brink of revolution. The central bank gov-
ernors of the G-10 nations, Luxembourg and Switzerland, established the Ba-
sle Committee after two large international banks failed in 1974,167 including
the German Herstatt Bank,1 68 "in response to the globalization of financial
markets and the difficulty in assessing the stability of its participants." 169 The
founding mandate of the Committee was a press release issued through the
Bank for International Settlements ("BIS") on February 12, 1975.170
The central principle of the Basle Committee guidelines state that "the
multinationalization of banking practices mandates the need for standards in
order to ensure the continued growth and stability of the international banking
community." 171 The general aim of the Committee is "to create common stan-
dards of banking oversight"'172 and to encourage "regular cooperation between
its member countries on banking supervisory matters."' 73 The purpose of the
Committee is described as:
establish[ing] minimum standards of financial regulation and
monitor[ing] adherence to those standards by member coun-
tries. Although the issues addressed by the Committee have
been selective (avoiding politically sensitive issues such as in-
sider trading, [sic] and trade sanctions), it has created a com-
mon framework for measuring a bank's financial integrity by
issuing guidelines for capitalization, OTC derivatives trading,
managing interest rate risk, and information sharing among
bank regulators.1
74 '
During the beginning of Basle, the primary risk that banking institutions
faced was credit risk. 175 The sovereign debt crisis in less developed countries
165. Volkman, supra note 6, at 581.
166. See Volkman, supra note 6, at 551.
167. Zaring, supra note 22, at 287.
168. See Case, supra note 61, at 221.
169. Volkman, supra note 6, at 557.
170. See Zaring, supra note 22, at 287.
171. Case, supra note 61, at 219.
172. Zaring, supra note 22, at 282.
173. Duncan E. Alford, Basle Committee Minimum Standards: International Regulatory Re-
sponse to the Failure of BCCI, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 241, 247 (1992).
174. Volkman, supra note 6, at 557-58.
175. See Norton & Olive, supra note 149, at 230.
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in the mid-1980s focused international attention on this issue. 176 The Basle
Committee centralized efforts to "strengthen systemic defenses to credit
risk"'177 which produced its 1988 Capital Accord outlining credit risk-based
capital standards.
Once the intermediary process expanded, however, it forced banks to re-
main competitive by not only increasing their range of financial activities but
to also take on additional forms of risk. Among these additional forms of risk,
the principal form was market risk which is "the risk that fluctuations in the
market value of portfolios of financial assets ... or other market exposures,
could materially alter a given financial institution's capital base and endanger
the livelihood of the institution's capital structure."'
' 78
As international banking institutions expanded into non-traditional bank-
ing activities they had greater exposure to additional risk, which could threaten
larger systemic risks. 179 International banking institutions also began to sepa-
rate, disaggregate, or hedge risk and trade in global financial markets. 18 0 Con-
sequently, they altered their risk profiles by "diversify[ing] their activities and
risks to overlap further with institutions prevalent in the securities indus-
try." 181 International banks were increasingly involved in non-traditional ac-
tivities, including swaps and OTC derivatives, exposing themselves and the
larger financial system to market risks. In response, the Basle Committee pro-
duced its Capital Accord Amendment in April 1995 to modify its principles
"to refine credit risk capital adequacy guidelines in OTC derivatives
transactions."1
82
The Basle Concordat in 1975,183 the Revised Concordat in 1983,184 and
the Supplement to the Basle Concordat on Ensuring of Adequate Information
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 231.
179. "Non-traditional systemic risks arise because enhanced linkages across national and in-
ternational financial markets and globally diversified financial institutions increase the size and
volatility of capital flows and the potential for concentrated disturbances to be transmitted more
rapidly across institutional groups or markets. The increased linkages across markets and insti-
tutions, and volatility of capital flows, provide the basis for rapid intermarket contagion in times
of financial market stress." Id. at 236. "The internationally contagious ramifications from the
Mexican peso devaluation in December 1994 and the ensuing foreign exchange liquidity crisis
of 1994-95, principally across currency and equity markets in Latin America and Asia, repre-
sents a glaring illustration of this phenomenon." Id.
180. See id. at 231-22.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 232.
183. "The Basle Concordat set forth five basic principles. These principles stressed that all
foreign banks should be supervised and that this responsibility should be shared by both the
parent-country and host-country supervisory authorities. The Concordat recommended that the
host authority should take primary responsibility for the adequacy of the foreign establishment's
liquidity and that the parent authority should be primarily responsible for the solvency of the
foreign establishment. The fifth principle of the Basle Concordat was that, because of the need
for cooperation between supervisory authorities, legal restraints on the transfer of information
should be removed." Case, supra note 61, at 221-22.
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Flows Between Banking Supervisory Authorities were Basle's main policy
statements. 185 After the BCCI scandal in 1991, Basle produced the Report on
Minimum Standards for the Supervision of International Banking Groups and
Their Cross-border Establishment in 1993.186
Now, the policy statements are compiled in its "Compendium of Docu-
ments Produced by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision."' 8 7 Its
"Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision" identify Basle's twenty-
five basic principles "intended as a guideline both for member countries and
for emerging market countries whose banking systems are striving for global
acceptance."188 The key objectives of the Basle Committee include:
'strengthen[ing] international cooperation, improv[ing] the
overall quality of banking supervision worldwide, and en-
sur[ing] that no foreign banking establishment escapes super-
vision.' The Committee has developed principles of
'consolidated supervision' over the past decade and created a
multinational framework for bank capital adequacy require-
ments, among other regulatory efforts. It describes itself as 'a
forum for ongoing cooperation between member countries on
banking supervisory matters.' 1 89
While the efforts of Basle are laudable, there are notable limitations.
First, the recommendations made by Basle are not yet widely enforceable.
"[N]either of the dominant schools in international law and political science
recognize organizations like IFROs [International Finance Regulatory Organi-
zations] .... IFROs suggest a broader international context in which relevant
184. The Revised Concordat began a move toward more specific supervisory standards.
"[Tiwo overriding principles were enunciated, 'first, that no foreign banking establishment
should escape supervision; secondly, that the supervision should be adequate." Mclnerney,
supra note 17, at 159. In the Revised Concordat, "[c]onsolidated supervision expanded the
parent regulatory authority responsibilities by advocating that the parent regulator monitor the
parent bank's total risk exposure and capital adequacy by reviewing the total operations of the
parent bank. Dual key supervision involves the regulatory authorities of each nation concur-
rently assessing each other's ability to supervise and carry out its responsibilities ... The ratio-
nale behind the dual key approach was to prevent a 'race to the bottom' approach in banking
regulation by which countries lowered supervisory practices in order to attract foreign invest-
ment and foreign capital." Case, supra note 61, at 222-23.
185. The Supplement stressed "because (m)utual trust between supervisory authorities can
only be achieved if exchanges of information can flow with confidence in both directions, su-
pervisory authorities should undertake an affirmative commitment to cooperate with each other
on all prudential matters." Id. at 223.
186. "The Report continued to build on the principles of consolidated supervision, dual key
supervision, and communication between supervisory authorities, while setting forth guidelines
for the implementation of these principles." Id. at 224. The United States was the first member
of the Basle Committee to enact legislation codifying the principles of the Report on Minimum
Standards with passage of its Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act. See id. at 226.
187. Volkman, supra note 6, at 558.
188. Id.
189. Zaring, supra note 22, at 288.
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international actors operate outside the formal categories of state action that
traditional international law recognizes." 190 Additionally, the Basle Commit-
tee and other IFROs attempt at lawmaking is known as "soft law,"' 191 which is
law that is persuasive but not binding on national authorities.
Second, apart from cultural and country differences, a primary issue in-
volves the criminality of certain financial disputes in particular countries, rais-
ing sovereignty walls:
An entity such as the Basle Committee could not dictate to its
member countries appropriate standards for financial privacy,
insider trading, or trade sanctions because such policies are
directed more towards criminal (or at least, politically undesir-
able) actions of individual market participants than towards
the safety and soundness of the financial markets themselves
.... Political differences can cause friction between local reg-
ulatory authorities and the foreign banks that they regulate.
1 92
Hence, because of the issues involved and the complexity of the interna-
tional regulatory structure, not only in banking but in other areas, suprana-
tional efforts are limited to cautious, non-provocative, non-revolutionary steps.
Until concerns over such cultural, systemic, safety, and sovereignty matters




It is evident from the discussion of the banking systems of various coun-
tries and regions that creating an international norm acceptable to all partici-
pants is difficult, particularly since banking and financial systems play such an
important part in the intricacies of policymaking and functioning of sovereign
governments. It is in this environment that a growing financial services move-
ment of convergence has emerged, wherein the various parts of the financial
services industry, including banking, securities, and insurance, in a country or
system are slowly being regulated by one regulatory board.
Historically, a highly segmented financial services industry was thought
to be crucial to the preservation of competition and financial market stability.
This occurred principally due to the functional consistency of institutional op-
erations and "clearly delineated legal and market distinctions among different
types of financial institutions."' 193 The technological improvements and finan-
190. Id. at 304.
191. Norton & Olive, supra note 149, at 235.
192. Volkman, supra note 6, at 567.
193. Norton & Olive, supra note 149, at 229; see also Joseph J. Norton, "Banking Law" in
the Twenty-First Century, in MAKING COMMERCIAL LAW 297, 299 (Ross Cranston, ed. 1997).
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cial advancements of the 1970s and 1980s, however, began to weaken the
importance of segmentation in the financial services industry. In response to
this changing environment, "[r]egulators gradually relaxed restrictions on per-
missible activities and expanded market access for domestic and foreign com-
petitors." 194 The degree of this change ranges, however, when looking at
individual systems and supranational efforts.
The regulatory and supervisory authorities on the national, international,
and supranational levels are developing ways to converge, particularly in the
area of functional activities - "i.e., the provision of similar regulatory and
supervisory standards for similar activities that international banks and securi-
ties firms currently engage in on an increasingly cross-border basis."' 195 Be-
cause other areas of regulation might be too complicated or sensitive to
involve several international authorities, functional regulation provides the
best opportunity for international convergence standardization. 196 Functional
regulation "is guiding banking supervisors and securities regulators to begin
jointly to coordinate efforts in order to better understand the banking and se-
curities businesses, the corporate structures and attendant risks involved in
each business, and the increasing complexities of non-traditional cross-border
activities."19
7
B. The United States
1. Glass-Steagall
Prior to 1999, the United States was highly regarded as one of the most
segmented financial services systems among industrialized nations. Under
Glass-Steagall, "banks in the United States [were] subject to federal and/or
state supervision, depending on their chartering authority and whether they
[were] federally insured or members of the Federal Reserve system. Insurance
companies [were] subject to individual state regulation. Securities firms
[were] subject to both state and federal supervision."' 98 Because of the nu-
merous state authorities, and as many as four federal authorities, to which
many banks were accountable, one expert said, "[T]he United States has the
most complex financial supervisory structure in the Western world. While the
U.S. is moving toward regulating along functional lines, most foreign coun-
tries have a few, but all-encompassing supervisory bodies that regulate along
institutional lines."' 99 One writer described the United States' Glass-Steagall
provisions as "antiquated" 2°° and went on to argue that "despite the success
194. Norton & Olive, supra note 149, at 229-30; NORTON, supra note 193, at 299.
195. NORTON, supra note 193, at 302.
196. Id. at 301-02.
197. Id.
198. McNevin, supra note 25, at 393-94.
199. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 36, at 721, citing International Comparison of Banking
Regulatory Structures.
200. McCoy, supra note 47, at 29.
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and global influence of the U.S. banking industry, our [pre-1999] banking
laws remain[ed] anachronistic in comparison with other commercial cen-
ters."'20  Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, said that the
Glass-Steagall provisions were 'perhaps the single most important anomaly
that now plagues our financial system."'
20 2
The legal basis for U.S. financial services segmentation was found in the
1933 Glass-Steagall Act. The Glass-Steagall Act was developed out of a
sense, now widely considered false, that much of the Depression was caused
by untrustworthy ties between commercial banks and investment banks.
203
Congressional hearings conducted in early 1933 seemed to
show that the presumed leaders of American enterprise - the
bankers and brokers - were guilty of disreputable and seem-
ingly dishonest dealings and gross misuses of the public's
trust. Looking back, some historians have come to a different




'[t]he Glass-Steagall Act was enacted to remedy the specula-
tive abuses that infected commercial banking prior to the col-
lapse of the stock market and the financial panic of 1929-
1933. Many banks, especially national banks, not only in-
vested heavily in speculative securities but entered the busi-
ness of investment banking in the traditional sense of the term
by buying original issues for public resale.'
20 5
Issues regarding conflicts of interest, maintaining a fair and competitive envi-
ronment, deconcentrating financial power, depositor risk of loss, etc., were at
the heart of the Glass-Steagall provisions.
Those who supported dismissing the Glass-Steagall provisions argued,
first, that "the assumptions used by the 1933 Congress in promulgating the
Glass-Steagall Act were based on incorrect data. With the benefit of hind-
sight, economists are able to conclusively demonstrate that the link between
commercial banks' securities activities and the stock market crash, bank pan-
ics and the Great Depression is tenuous.
'20 6
201. Id.
202. Id. at 30.
203. See, e.g., Understanding, supra note 48.
204. Id.
205. Id., citing Brief, First National City Bank (1970) in support of the Comptroller of the
Currency (William Camp), who had given bank permission to offer commingled investment
accounts in Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
206. McCoy, supra note 47, at 30.
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Some historians now say the chief culprit of bank failures was
the Depression itself, which caused real estate and other val-
ues to fall, undermining bank loans. Securities abuses played
a minimal role in the collapse of banks ...and caused few
failures among the New York banks with the largest Wall
Street operations.
20 7
Second, proponents of convergence argued that laws must change with
the times. Present changes in financial services require a reexamination of the
relevance of certain regulatory provisions. 20 8 "[S]ince the Glass-Steagall
Act's enactment in 1933, the American financial services landscape has
changed dramatically. The complexity of financial regulation, the structure of
American capital markets, technological progress and the tremendous growth
of the economy all point to the appropriateness of re-examining the separation
of commercial and investment banking."
20 9
In addition, many argued that maintaining the Glass-Steagall walls did
not make good economic sense for the United States. Many of the more uni-
versal systems of other countries were becoming more competitive by devel-
oping economies of scale and becoming more efficient through convergence.
Glass-Steagall applied today "prevents corporations, state and local govern-
ment enterprises, and other borrowers from realizing the cost, efficiency, and
other benefits that would result from greater competition among providers of
financial services."
'210
For example, modern portfoiio theory conclusively demon-
strates that diversification of investments is the best way to
minimize risk. It is ironic, then, that the Glass-Steagall Act
achieves the opposite of its purported objective, the promotion
of bank safety and soundness. By restricting the types of in-
vestments and securities activities commercial banks may en-
gage in, legislators actually increase commercial banks' risk
rather than decrease it.
211
This inhibition on U.S. financial institutions not only affected competi-
tiveness within the U.S. market, but also competitiveness abroad. "At the in-
ternational level, the concern is that U.S. companies, lenders as well as
borrowers, are hobbled by restraints that do not inhibit their foreign counter-
parts... Glass-Steagall is ill-suited to the needs of the American economy for
productivity and growth.
212
207. Understanding, supra note 48.
208. See McCoy, supra note 47, at 30.
209. Id.
210. Glass-Steagall: Overdue for Repeal, http://jpmorgan.com/Corpinfo/Perspectivesl
Iinkedjfiles/GS/GS1.html (Apr. 1995) [hereinafter Overdue].
211. McCoy, supra note 47, at 31-2.
212. Overdue, supra note 210.
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Finally, the United States' influence in banking and finance may have
been diminished as long as Glass-Steagall remained in place.21 3 "'American
banks' share of the financial services market diminished as consumers and
businesses turned in greater numbers to the securities market as an alternative
way to invest and to raise capital. '21 4 "The integration of the U.S. economy in
an ever more global marketplace has increased the handicap U.S. firms face
under Glass-Steagall. The competitive disadvantages have become even more
pronounced since other countries that once had Glass-Steagall-like restrictions
... have dropped them.
'21 5
Because international banks must make decisions based on market share
and ability to profit, many felt that the regulatory environment in the United
States was too burdensome to justify maintaining a bank there.
[T]he U.S. Federal Reserve Board... recently acknowledged
that at least four foreign banks in the United States have relin-
quished or were considering relinquishing their commercial
banking licenses due to what they perceive as a hostile U.S.
regulatory environment for foreign banks. In support of the
Fed's concerns, recent surveys indicate that almost twenty
percent of foreign bank executives stated that they were con-
sidering surrendering their U.S. banking licenses.., to opt for
alternative business structures if domestic U.S. regulatory ob-
stacles separating banking and securities activities are left
intact.21
6
The difficulty some countries have in abolishing financial industry seg-
mentation, like the United States recently, shows the difficulty the interna-
tional community will have in developing international standards. The
constant interplay between issues of competitiveness, financial safety, and
soundness will continue to raise or maintain barriers. Thus, "while barriers
between banking and securities businesses remain national, they are clearly
interlinked with regional and international concerns. In particular, these barri-
ers serve to prevent comprehensive international regulatory convergence be-
tween banking and securities regulators on similar financial activities.
'217
213. See, e.g., McCoy, supra note 47.
214. Id. at 30.
215. Overdue, supra note 210.
216. Norton & Olive, supra note 149, at 257-58. "The regulatory obstacles specifically arise
because of the inability of foreign banks to comply with the qualifying foreign banking organi-
zation ("QFBO") requirement under US laws regulating foreign bank activities which mandate
that, to have banking offices in the United States, the international business of a foreign bank
and its affiliates must consist predominately of banking and other financial activities, as op-
posed to securities or insurance activities. Managers of foreign banks therefore must choose
how to expand their operations in the United States: if they choose to conduct banking activities,
they can conduct only limited securities and limited insurance activities." Id. at 257-58.
217. Id. at 296.
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In response to the growing demand of the international financial environ-
ment, the United States slowly began to chip away at the Glass-Steagall provi-
sions. In the 1980s, commercial bank lending profits began to decline as
businesses turned towards commercial paper for short-term financing. As a
result, Bankers Trust in 1987 petitioned the Federal Reserve to allow it "to
engage in private placements of commercial paper. '218 After previously re-
jecting a similar proposal by Citicorp in 1984,219 the Federal Reserve, this
time, was more receptive. "The Federal Reserve determined that affiliates
could engage in bank-ineligible securities activities such as the private place-
ment of commercial paper, so long as the §20 subsidiary's revenues from such
activities did not account for more than 5% of the bank holding company's
revenues. '220 The Federal Reserve then expanded the bank-ineligible securi-
ties activities and increased the revenue limit to 10% in 1989, and to 25% in
1997.221 This heightened deregulation activity triggered a number of securi-
ties firm acquisitions by commercial banks.2 22 Most recently, the United
States has moved its financial industry regulation closer to the brink of revolu-
tion, at least in the area of convergence, with the passage of the 1999 Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act.
2. Gramm-Leach-Bliley
After years of Depression era legislation, debate, and slow chipping away
at Glass-Steagall, the U.S. Congress, by a vote of 90 to 8 in the Senate and 362
to 57 in the House,223 sent President Bill Clinton a bill to tear down barriers
within the financial services industry. 224 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was
described by President Clinton as part of efforts to propel "'our economy into
the 21' t century, continuing the longest peacetime economic expansion in our
history.'- 225 Gramm-Leach-Bliley "removes legal barriers dating to the De-
pression and allows banks, securities firms and insurance companies to form
one-stop financial conglomerates marketing a range of financial products.
226
218. McCoy, supra note 47, at 30.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 30-31.
222. "On 7 April 1997, Bankers Trust announced that it would acquire Alex Brown & Sons
in a stock swap valued at $1.7 billion ... In mid-May, Swiss Bank Corporation acquired Dillon
Read for $600m and on 9 June, Bank America Corporation, the third largest commercial bank in
the U.S., announced its plan to purchase Robertson, Stephens & Co for $540m. The most recent
proposed acquisition was Nations Bank Corporation's $1.2 billion combined cash-stock offer
for Montgomery Securities." McCoy, supra note 47, at 30. Note that several of these named
institutions have recently been involved - as the target or actor - in merger or acquisition
transactions, sometimes resulting in changed names.
223. See Marcy Gordon, Banking Overhaul Approved: Clinton Gets Historic Bill, SAN
ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, Nov. 5, 1990, at IA.
224. See id.
225. Id. at 16A.
226. Pamela Yip, One-stop Shopping, SAN ANToNio ExPREss-NEws, Feb. 14, 2000, at IF.
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This legislation will help U.S. financial companies compete on an interna-
tional level already operating in a converged format.
C. Canada and Mexico
Canada and Mexico have systems that are similar to their "new and im-
proved" NAFTA co-member, the United States. "Canadian banking organiza-
tions are not constrained by the artificial product line distinctions found in the
Glass-Steagall Act. Under present Canadian law, banks, insurance companies,
and securities firms are permitted to own one another and to provide services
to the public through separate subsidiaries in a holding company structure.
227
While some refer to the Mexican banking system as "a work in pro-
gress," 228 the system has the bases for much more of a modern structure than
even the United States.
At the time of the NAFTA's negotiation, Mexico's banking
market was dominated by six large nationwide institutions,
with seven smaller regional banks playing a secondary role.
Mexican banks may branch anywhere in the country. Banks
may be owned by financial groups that own other financial
services firms such as securities and insurance companies.
229
Mexico's infant banking system has shown signs of progressiveness, and
with its present structure, may be an internationally competitive force in the
near future:
Mexico's privatization and realignment of its banking system,
coupled with an accelerated liberalization of its financial mar-
kets, has pushed Mexico's financial system out of the depths
of severe economic crisis of the 1980s and into a radical trans-
formation within ten years. Its financial system is small, con-
centrated, and underdeveloped, yet flexible. Based on the
European universal banking model, it allows for the creation
of financial groups under one umbrella organization through
separately capitalized subsidiaries which can offer banking,
insurance, and securities services. Its markets are shallow,
unsophisticated, and immature compared to those in the
United States and Canada. It is precisely these market charac-
teristics - along with the fact that the consumer base is large
enough, the competition weak enough, the scope of allowable
activities broad enough, and the regulatory system young
enough - that will entice investors across the border.
230
227. Gouvin, supra note 32, at 266.
228. Id. at 268.
229. Id. at 268-69.
230. McNevin, supra note 25, at 395.
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D. Japan
Japan's financial services industry, like the United States prior to 1999, is
very segmented. This is so, for the most part, because the history of the
United States and Japan is intertwined. There are, however, different versions
that tell how the Japanese Glass-Steagall-like structure came to exist. One
version, placing responsibility in the hands of the Japanese,2 3' says that:
[I]mmediately after the Second World War, in an attempt to
eradicate the zaibatsu financial-industrial conglomerates
blamed for leading Japan into the Second World War, the Jap-
anese Diet (Parliament) passed a series of laws restricting
bank activities. Holding companies were abolished. Banks
were restricted from engaging in securities and insurance ac-
tivities, and bank ownership of other Japanese companies was
limited.
2 32
Another version places responsibility with United States' General Mac-
Arthur arguing that:
The roots of Japan's financial system . . . can be traced back
in large part to the United States' occupation of Japan after the
Second World War. General MacArthur and his team of
economists and lawyers mandated revolutionary change for
Japan's financial system. They dismantled Japan's zaibatsu
[sic], the dominant industrial groups, by banning and dissolv-
ing the holding companies that controlled them .... In order
to keep the securities business out of the hands of the former
zaibatsu banks, the occupation authorities also gave Japan's
financial markets a Glass-Steagall, in the form of Article 65 of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1948. Article 65 prohib-
ited banks from participating in the domestic securities indus-
try, from holding more than five percent of a securities
company, and from selling equity or underwriting securities
.... To maintain the predominance of banks in the financial
system, securities and securities market activity were
repressed.
2 33
No matter the source of Japan's deep segmentation, it is evident that "Ja-
pan [now] currently maintains the greatest separation of financial services
among the major industrialized countries. '2 34 Japan's strict separation be-
231. Valentine V. Craig, Japanese Banking: A Time of Crisis, 11(2) FDIC BANKING REV. 9,
9 (1998).
232. Id.
233. Patrikis, supra note 26, at 580; see Norton & Olive, supra note 149, at 280-82.




tween commercial and investment banking in Article 65 of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1948 closely models the U.S. Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.
"The Japanese law prohibits banks from engaging directly in the domestic
securities business and, similarly, securities firms cannot participate in com-
mercial banking activities like accepting deposits or making loans other than
for securities purchases. ' 235 While Japan separates commercial banking, in-
vestment banking, securities, and insurance, some differences do exist be-
tween the Japanese Article 65 and the U.S. Glass-Steagall Act.
236
Like the United States, Japan has also begun to chip away at its segmen-
tation. The implementation of the "Big Bang" reforms beginning in April
1998, are the result of Japan's movement away from "Glass-Steagall-like
restrictions.
'2 37
The effect of sustained periods of gradual liberalization in the
Japanese financial markets following U.S. military occupation
led the MoF to direct its Advisory Councils in the mid-1980s
to address the issue of overall structural reform of the Japa-
nese financial system. . .. The reports addressed systemic and
strategic concerns stemming from structural changes in Ja-
pan's economy, the internationalization of Japanese finance,
and changing patterns of corporate finance by Japanese com-
panies. The core reform proposals involved removing or lim-
iting the legal and regulatory barriers between the fragmented
banking and securities industries.2 3
8
E. The European Union
In 1989, the European Union issued the Second Banking Directive, to
become effective January 1, 1993. "As a result, the legal restrictions separat-
ing banking and securities activities have been largely eliminated in European
capital markets. The Directives provided that EU banks and securities firms,
and most foreign institutions participating in the 'Single Market' may engage
235. Id.
236. "Several significant differences between Article 65 and the Glass-Steagall Act exist,
however. For instance, Article 65 generally permits Japanese banks to purchase, sell, and invest
in securities without limitation as to type, while the Glass-Steagall Act restricts bank invest-
ments in securities to certain debt instruments and generally excludes investment in equity se-
curities. Next, Article 65, in contrast to the 'engaged principally' and 'gross revenue'
limitations section 20 imposes, does not prevent Japanese banks from affiliating with securities
firms. In fact, Japanese city banks, by cross-shareholdings or other contractual arrangements,
generally have close affiliations with securities firms. Finally, while US national banks and
BHC non-bank affiliates are permitted to engage in a wide array of retail brokerage activities
and related services, Article 65 generally prohibits Japanese banks from engaging in such activi-
ties." Norton & Olive, supra note 149, at 281-82.
237. See Overdue, supra note 210; see also Patrikis, supra note 26, at 584.
238. Norton & Olive, supra note 149, at 284-85.
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in qualified 'universal banking."' 239 After the First Banking Directive limited
its application to "credit institutions,"' 240 the Second Banking Directive intro-
duced the concept of a "single banking license" and established "mutual
recognition."
241
The EU also issued the Investment Services Directive (ISD) modeled af-
ter the Second Banking Directive to create a level playing field for EU securi-
ties firms. 242 The ISD became effective January 1, 1996, and applies to any
credit institution that provides investment services, although banks that are
already covered under the Second Banking Directive are not required to reap-
ply for authorization under the ISD.
243
Unlike the Second Banking Directive, the ISD does not ex-
clude the United States, Japan, and other non-EU states from
the 'single passport' scheme. The perceived lack of universal
access to the EU Single Market was one of the most heavily
debated issues prior to the issuance of the Second Banking
Directive .... 244 Under the ISD approach to qualified na-
tional treatment, non-EU states must afford EU securities
firms the same competitive opportunities available to domes-
tic securities firms. The ISD further provides for continuous
review to determine whether non-EU states provide for na-
tional treatment and 'effective market access' to EU securities
firms.
24 5
F. Convergence of International Regulation
In 1993, an informal committee created a Tripartite Group, 246 comprised
of the representatives from the Basle Committee, the International Organiza-
tion of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO), and the International Association
of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).247 This group aimed to address issues asso-
239. Id. at 252.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 253.
242. Id. at 254.
243. Id..
244. Id. at 255.
245. Id. "Even with qualified national treatment reciprocity, however, non-EU firms must
still separately incorporate and capitalize their EU subsidiaries in order to secure the benefits of
the single passport. The ISD contains a grandfather clause, however, for securities firms al-
ready authorized by an EU Member State to provide investment services prior to December 31,
1995 ... This reservation is particularly advantageous to US international banks and investment
firms because most, if not all, of the major U.S. financial institutions owned previously-incorpo-
rated investment firm subsidiaries in one or more EU Member States." Id. at 255-56.
246. The Tripartite Group became the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates in 1996,
which continued the work of the group. The Joint Forum issued a series of papers in February
1998, relating to regulatory coordination in the three sectors of the financial services industry.
See Volkman, supra note 6, at 564-65.
247. See id. at 564.
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ciated with increasing the integration of banking, securities, and insurance in-
dustries. In July 1995, the group released its report entitled "The Supervision
of Financial Conglomerates." A central tenet of the report was that "the tradi-
tional boundaries of regulatory supervision for the financial sectors are out-
dated" 248 and are often the target of exploitation through regulatory arbitrage
by those taking advantage of differences between financial segment regula-
tions and differing regulations between countries.
249
Notwithstanding the potential systemic risks, continued legis-
lative or regulatory attempts to maintain segmented regulatory
frameworks between international banks and securities firms
will only serve to enhance 'regulator arbitrage' by shifting fi-
nancial activities to unregulated or less regulated jurisdictions
within the global financial community and undermining the
regulatory convergence process .... 250 [T]he convergence
process assuredly marks the transition from fragmented, na-
tionally-based regulatory arrangements in the banking and se-
curities industries toward a system of international regulatory
principles and standards.
251
The regulatory convergence process has inevitably developed
through competitive forces between banks and securities
firms. International banks and securities firms now have the
expertise and technological abilities to engage in the full spec-
trum of financial activities and services anywhere in the
world. Advances in telecommunications and computer tech-
nology have provided banks and securities firms with new and
more efficient opportunities to expand nationally, regionally,
and globally in search of new financial activities, markets, and
profits. The financial and technological innovations have en-
couraged even more intense competition amongst internation-
ally diversified banks and securities firms to continuously
seek out non-traditional risks and increased profits, and to ac-
quire, merge with or otherwise eliminate smaller institutions
from the competitive sphere in particular market segments.
Thus, the banking and securities industries are becoming in-
creasingly blurred, perhaps to the point where fundamental
distinctions no longer exist in many operational areas.
252
While the Basle Committee has led the way toward international coopera-
tion and now convergence in the banking arena, IOSCO has done the same for
248. Id. at 565.
249. See id.
250. Norton & Olive, supra note 149, at 237.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 235.
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securities and IAIS for insurance firms. These three organizations will be-
come the major partnership that could lead international efforts toward conver-
gence and increased cooperation.
[O]ne of the most significant components of banking law in
the twenty-first century will be the necessity that regulatory
and market participants must interact compatibly, on an inter-
disciplinary basis, to provide an appropriate environment for
the necessary formation of a new regulatory-market "partner-
ship." This partnership will exist on at least three levels. The
first level will be a partnership between the various diversified
financial groups and their respective regulators. The second
level will be an increasingly coalescing partnership among the
banking, securities, and insurance industries. The third level
will be an emerging partnership between diversified financial
groups and supranational regulatory establishments, including
the Basle Committee, the Bank for International Settlements
('BIS'), and IOSCO.253
1. IOSCO
IOSCO is a private organization that arose out of the Interamerican Asso-
ciation of Securities Commissions and Similar Agencies in 1984, when the
Association's members passed bylaws changing it "from a regional group to a
global agglomeration of securities regulators. ' 254 Today, IOSCO consists of
over 100 representatives from the world's securities regulators. 255 "IOSCO
boasts that its membership covers eighty-five percent of the world's capital
markets." 256
According to the first Secretary General of IOSCO, the organization's
goals focus on "'improving cooperation and coordinating and harmonizing
securities and futures regulations. . . [by] . . . 1) cooperat[ing] in order to
maintain fair and efficient markets; 2) exchang[ing] information designed to
further the development of domestic markets; 3) establish[ing] standards and
effective surveillance of international securities transactions; and 4)
provid[ing] mutual assistance for enforcement. ' 257
Basle and IOSCO have begun several joint initiatives. "The first formal
contacts between international banking and securities regulators occurred in
1988. This led to the issuance of a joint paper on exchanges of information
between banking and securities supervisors in April 1990 and the recommen-
dation that information 'gateways' be established at the national and interna-
253. Id. at 229.
254. See Zaring, supra note 22, at 282.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 292.
257. Id. at 292-93.
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tional levels."2 58 Joint projects, including those in 1995,259 "represent the
building blocks of the international regulatory convergence process, and will
enable banking and securities regulators to better understand the increasingly
complex activities, technological innovations, and attendant risks undertaken
by international banks and securities firms. '2 60 Coordination, cooperation,
and information-sharing will help move regulation, monitoring, supervision,
transparency, and market discipline into the 21 t century.
[R]egulatory convergence among banking supervisors and se-
curities regulators must continue to evolve over the next dec-
ade to meet the challenges presented by internationally
diversified financial institutions and interlinked financial mar-
kets. This observation was solidified in May 1996 when the
Basle Committee and IOSCO officially declared the existence
of a partnership to pursue the "common goal of improving the
quality of supervision worldwide and responding to financial
market developments in a timely, effective and efficient man-
ner." In pursuit of this common goal, the Basle Committee
and IOSCO identified and resolved to work actively together
to promote ... eight major principles.
261
2. IAIS
IAIS, created in 1994 as an Illinois nonprofit corporation, is the newest of
the financial services organizations on the international level. IAIS is made up
of representatives from nearly 100 of the world's insurance regulators that are
interested in coordinating their activities. '262 The Basle Committee has estab-
lished itself "at the forefront of international banking regulation"2 63 while
IOSCO has struggled to keep up with that pace.2 6 4 Their objectives include
258. Norton & Olive, supra note 149, at 243.
259. Id. at 243-44. "(1) [T~he establishment of a common framework of principles for the
regulation and supervision of swaps and OTC derivatives activities of banks and securities
firms; (2) the supervision of international financial conglomerates; and (3) disclosure of trading
and OTC derivatives activities of international banks and securities firms."
260. Id. at 244.
261. Id. at 249-50. These principles are (1) Cooperation and information flows among super-
visory authorities should be as free as possible from impediments both nationally and interna-
tionally. (2) All banks and securities firms should be subject to effective supervision, including
the supervision of capital. (3) Geographically and/or functionally diversified financial groups
require special supervisory arrangements. (4) All banks and securities firms should have ade-
quate capital. (5) Proper risk management by the firm is a prerequisite for financial stability.
(6) The transparency and integrity of markets and supervision rely on adequate reporting and
disclosure of operations. (7) The resilience of markets to the failure of individual firms must be
maintained. (8) The supervisory process needs to be constantly maintained and improved.
262. Zaring, supra note 22, at 282-83, 297.
263. Id. at 297.
264. Id.
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establishing "uniform rules through the work of the organization. ' '265 IAIS,
however, "is just beginning to define its role in the field of insurance regula-
tion" and "currently serves only as a forum for the exchange of information
and experiences by insurance supervisors across the world. '266 As the IAIS'
influence grows, it may become an important force in the harmonization of
insurance regulation on the international level and of international conver-
gence in the future.
V. TECHNOLOGY
Rapid developments in technology, telecommunications, and access to
information have increased the available market for banks and their
competitors. 26
7
[A]s of 1995, about thirty million households and three mil-
lion merchants in the United States enjoyed access to the In-
ternet. Already, merchants are meeting customers - and each
other - across this data highway .... In 1996 Internet transac-
tions were growing by an estimated 1 percent a day, or 365
percent a year . . . .[B]y the year 2000 some $600 billion
worth of goods and services will be purchased over the
Internet. 26
8
Technology will be an important tool for potential revolutionary change
in banking. "Above all .... the revolution in banking has occurred outside the
legal system through the medium of fast-paced developments in the
marketplace." 269
What changed banking from an institution to a business was,
of course, technology .... Bankers had always thought they
were being paid for their judgment, for taking risks in lending
money, but in fact most of their profits had come from ex-
ploiting a rich information advantage over people who were
not bankers . . . . Command of such information allowed
banks to set prices for loans efficiently through standardized
procedures. But today anyone - you or I or our children - can
sit at a computer console and pull out of the air (literally,
265. Id. at 298. IAIS wishes to: "1) formally establish an independent forum for meetings of
insurance supervisors for their mutual benefit, 2) engender awareness of common interests and
concerns among such insurance supervisors, 3) encourage wide international personal and offi-
cial contacts among insurance supervisors, and 4) enhance the ability of insurance supervisors to
better protect insurance policyholders and to better promote and secure efficient insurance mar-
kets." Id.
266. Id.
267. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 36, at 40.
268. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 36, at 40.
269. Id. at 29.
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through satellite services) information as good as the bank has
about all these variables.
270
The Internet is now used for all types of electronic commerce, ranging
from buying and selling clothes, CDs, and books to computers and plane tick-
ets. More traditional forms of payments via credit card are currently used.
ECash, however, has slowly entered the Internet commerce market as a
method of electronic payment. "[T]he Internet is already being used to carry
out payment and clearance functions that are no different in principle from
checks or that formerly cutting-edge technology, electronic funds transfer.
''271
ECash works similarly to a credit card or check debit card with the exception
of an actual plastic card. An individual can generate an account via the In-
ternet or directly at a bank and an ECash credit line is established. The buyer
uses an account number when buying goods or services. 272 ECash processors
or providers include non-bank companies such as CyberCash, Inc., First Vir-
tual Holdings, Inc., and DigiCash, Inc.2 73 Smaller non-bank companies, such
as Vantage Services, Inc., WebNow Internet, and NetConcept, Inc. are begin-
ning to offer similar services to the market. In addition, well-known compa-
nies like Visa are now beginning to market their products and services directly
to consumers via the Internet, potentially placing banks who have partnered
with Visa in a position to compete with non-bank companies in the ECash
market.274 Many believe, however, that the ECash market will not be able to
sustain itself, particularly because traditional forms of payment have worked
well and are familiar to consumers. In fact, at least one of the ECash compa-
nies has already filed for bankruptcy.
Banking customers today can also locate a bank's website over the In-
ternet to check account status, transfer money between accounts, and be a
source of payment to third parties.275 Some banks are even becoming prima-
rily Internet banks, having one central bank and then marketing their services
over the Internet, reducing the need for branches. 276 This type of banking
reduces overhead, allows savings to be passed on to consumers, and may soon
make banking available to international bank customers and in varying curren-
cies.277 "Internet-based electronic banks and Internet banking open the doors
270. MARTIN MAYER, THE BANKERS: THE NEXT GENERATION, THE NEW WORLDS OF
MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING IN AN ELECTRONIC AGE 19-20 (Truman Talley Books ed., 1997).
271. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 36, at 40.
272. See, e.g., http://demenet.ict.tuwien.ac.at/eipan/cikersch/ec.html, 11/20/01.
273. See id.; see also http://demet.ict.tuwien.ac.at/eipan/cikersch/cc.html, 11/20/01; http://
demet.ict.tuwien.ac.at/eipan/cikersch/fv.html, 11/20/01.
274. See Tim Clark, Visa to launch payment server for banks, http://www.news.com/News/
ItemIO,4,84-37264,00.html?tt.yfin. .txt.ni, 6/1/99.
275. An example is Bank of America's online banking services.
276. Examples include Telebanc Financial Corporation, Security First Network Bank,
NedBank, and CompuBank.
277. See Security First Network Bank, http://www.sfnb.com/infodesk/caq-us.html, 6/1/99;
see also http://point.lycos.com/reviews/lnternetStandardsandSecurity_9310.html, 6/1/99.
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for financial institutions to attract new customers and lower the institutions'
overall costs. '278 Furthermore, one-third of depositors will be doing some on-
line banking in three years, increasing to one-half of depositors in five
years.279 Securities can also be bought and sold over the Internet, enabling
large corporations and small businesses opportunity to access both public and
private equity capital.28 0 In fact, "14 million people will have online broker-
age accounts within five years, and online trading is predicted to double every
year for the next four years.
'28 1
These developments in banking and the financial services industry will
continue to raise issues of jurisdiction, regulation reform, international stan-
dards, fraud, and security. One primary difficulty will be dealing with the
varying levels of technological sophistication between international banking
systems. For example, "'[t]here is no home banking in the United States.
Germany already has it.' There are already a million people in Germany pay-
ing their bills through Telekom On-Line, which allows customers to transfer
money directly from their bank account to the bank account of the company
that sent them the bill, and Japan is making a rapid transition from a cash
society to an electronic-payments society, largely skipping the checking
stage."
2 82
Another issue deals with cultural inhibitions associated with internet buy-
ing - some cultures or countries are more open to using the internet as a shop-
ping source, while others are not.
[A]n estimated 50 million Europeans are online and that...
number is growing. But with few exceptions, making
purchases isn't what Europeans like to do with their PCs ....
In fact, . . . Europeans value the Internet most as a way to
work from home, catch up on local politics, choose vacation
destinations, and take courses. Europe's only real online
shoppers? The French.
283
The Basle Committee is also getting involved in this new arena of inter-
national banking via technology by reviewing the regulatory needs for such an
environment. The Committee, in March 1998, "took an initial step in review-
ing supervisory issues related to technological advances. The risk manage-
ment document (distributed by the Basle Committee) suggests that
278. Jacqueline Marcucci, The Brave New World of Banking on the Internet: The Revolution
of our Banking Practices, 23(2) NOVA L. REV. 739, 739 (1999).
279. Vicki Vaughan, Banking.com: No Lines, No Waiting with Boom in Online Financial
Services, SAN ANTONIO EXPREss-NEWS, Aug. 29, 1999, at 1J.
280. An example is ETrade.
281. Robert Michlewicz, Virtual Road Shows Tap Investor Interest, SAN ANTONIO BUSINESS
JOURNAL, June 4, 1999, Comment, at 66.
282. MAYER, supra note 271, at 172.




'operational risk, risk to reputation, and legal risk [are] the most important risk
categories for electronic banking and electronic money.'
284
Internet banking presents new legal and regulatory issues re-
garding banks and nonbank entities and their ability to gather,
transfer, and store money. The federal and international agen-
cies that regulate banks are faced with the problem of trying to
apply existing regulations to banking on the Internet or create
new regulations. The banking functions being performed on
the Internet pose both legal and regulatory challenges. Regu-
lating the movement of money and transactions is much more
complex than regulating a bank's web page. New regulatory
issues also arise from using non-bank entities to store money
on the Internet. Additionally, . . . issues of privacy of confi-





One of the major issues involving international banking is money laun-
dering. "The Financial Action Task Force, created in 1989 by the seven major
industrial nations and the President of the European Commission, estimated
that the amount of money being laundered through either banks or investments
was US$85 billion per year."'286 The transition from strong to weak bank se-
crecy laws, which have been at the heart of the money laundering issue, has
been difficult for all involved. Many banks and bank secrecy jurisdictions
argue that "bank secrecy laws are a free market response to limitations upon
the free movement of capital. '287 In addition, some argue that "[b]anks are in
business to make money. Undetected money launderers are good business for
bankers since ... they do assist liquidity and contribute to overheads by pay-
ing bank charges. ' 288 Advocates of anti-money laundering efforts argue that
"a crucial part of deterring and punishing criminals is to seize the proceeds of
the criminals' activities" 289 and to remove the financial resources available to
criminals. This money laundering issue is currently being debated by interna-
284. Marcucci, supra note 277, at 752.
285. Id. at 741.
286. Andrew Haynes, Money Laundering and Changes in International Banking Regulation,
8(11) J. INT'L BANKING L. 454, 454 (1993).
287. Richard T. Preiss, Privacy of Financial Information and Civil Rights Issues: The Impli-
cations for Investigating and Prosecuting International Economic Crime, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L.
525, 528 (1996).
288. Michael Levi, Regulating Money Laundering: The Death of Bank Secrecy in the UK,
31(2) BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 109, 112 (1991).
289. Haynes, supra note 285, at 454.
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tional banking centers and authorities and will continue to affect the changing
face of international banking and its regulation.
B. Future of Banking
Another issue facing the international banking industry is the possibility
that banking will become antiquated. Individuals are becoming increasingly
informed through technological advances and are able to borrow directly from
sources other than banks. Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of the Board of Gov-
ernors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System, remarked "public policy.., should
be concerned with the decline in the importance of banking . . .. As the non-
banking sector expands relative to the banking sector - because of artificial
legal barriers to bank expansion - human resources, physical assets, and capi-
tal must be reallocated to the non-bank sector. The 'transaction costs' of this
reallocation are not trivial. ' 290 "[B]anks continue to be in danger of losing
their social function. And the loss of social function is death . . .. 'This indus-
try is getting outdated right before our eyes.' ,,291 "The future of these types of
banks is uncertain, but the technology allowing all banking services to be
available at the stroke of a finger and in the privacy of the home is here to
stay."2 9
2
On the other hand, "[i]t is certainly true that non-banks have begun to
offer financial services . . .. However, it is noteworthy that these non-bank
firms have chosen to enter niche markets, which do not threaten the intermedi-
ary/payment functions offered by banks.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Banking is in a state of revolution on the international level. However, its
regulation and the regulatory structures that govern it have not been as revolu-
tionary, preferring instead to move cautiously, in a seeming flirt with revolu-
tion. While change and progress are evident on domestic, international, and
supranational levels, caution continues to frustrate the revolutionary change
needed to keep up with advances in technology and in the globalization of
markets. The next century will truly be interesting to observe as national and
international systems grapple with domestic concerns and the surge of
internationalism.
All this taken into consideration, one quickly realizes that the
nature of the banking business (and of banking institutions
and of financial markets) is in a dramatic state of metamor-
phosis. This metamorphosis is not only one of market
290. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 36, at 37-38, citing Remarks by Alan Greenspan, Chair-
man, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May 6, 1993.
291. MAYER, supra note 271, at 29.
292. Marcucci, supra note 277, at 743.
293. HEFFERNAN, supra note 13, at 29.
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interconnections and of national-regional-international inter-
dependence. Law (both 'hard' and 'soft' law) becomes a criti-
cal instrument in effecting this transformation and in devising
a new framework for international regulation and supervision
in the financial services area. The success of this new frame-
work will be largely dependent on forging and sustaining a
new working 'partnership' among (i) national and interna-
tional supervisors/regulators in each of the key financial ser-
vices areas (i.e., banking, securities and insurance), (ii) the
relevant international accounting bodies, and (iii) the senior
management of the major international financial institutions
and financial conglomerates. The study of banking law in the
twenty-first century will be influenced radically by this on-
going metamorphosis.
294
294. NORTON, supra note 173, at 322.
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